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· by Eduardo Enrique Gelbstein 
Doctoral Thesis 
ABSTRACT 
The present thesis is concerned with a quantitative examination 
of the on-line control.of railway movements and develops a 
mathematical technique for the evaluation of safety based on 
the use of Markov processes, illustrated with examples. 
In addition, the thesis presents a design methodology applicable 
to electronic safety systems. These systems are shown to be an 
essential element in the development of fully electronic railway 
signalling systems, as well as in the increased automation of 
railway movements. 
An analysis of the limits of automation of railway movements is 
described and discussed together with a possible system 
configuration for the achievement of crewless train operation. 
The research described herein has been carried out at the British 
Railways R & D division and the methods described have been 
successfully applied to real engineering problems. 
The industrial R & D background of the present thesis is also 
reflected in the inclusion of a section on the socio-economic 
consequences of major innovation, particularly in the field of 
automation and in the consideration of costs and benefits. 
iv 
Section 2 contains an approach evolved jointly with Mr. 
W.T. Parkman, also at the R & D Division of British Railways, 
and has been published as Reference 16. 
Section 5 is a short description or the work carried out by 
the group under the direct responsibility of the author at the 
R & D Division of British Railways. 
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1. SUMMARY 
The present Thesis examines some of the problems and 
opportunities related to the use of electronics in railway 
control systems~ 
Although railways make considerable use of electronics, 
this is often in telecommunications and instrumentation, 
rather than in control. 
Section 2 presents a short description of railway controls 
as feedback systems, and although simplified and inadequate 
for modelling purposes, these feedback systems are considered 
to be useful in identifying the fundamental functions, such 
as making the system safe by avoiding accidents. 
Railway safety has been achieved over the years through both 
technology and disciplined use of Rules and Regulations 
The concept of "failur~-to-safety", discussed in Section 3, 
has been successfully applied to.railway signalling and also 
vehicle braking systems. 
When considering the use of electronics in systems with 
identifiable safety requirements, it becomes desirable to 
extend the concept of failure to safety to include data. 
This is done in Section 3 by introducing the concepts of 
"Failure" and "Error", as well as the hypothesis that the 
ability to detect the presence of faults in a system and the 
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ability to take action after detecting a fault are sufficient 
conditions for the implementation of a system exhibiting 
."Failure-to-Saf~ty" characberistics. 
In addition two new concepts are introduced: . The first one 
is that Failure-to-Safety may not be the best way to describe 
the performance of a safety system. This is complemented by 
proposing the definiti?n of "Probability of Accident", which 
takes into accriunt other factors such as human error and 
the nature of standby systems where these are used. 
The second concept, presented in Section 4, is that a 
mathematical description of the behaviour of a safety system 
can be achieved through the use of Markov processes and this 
is shown in greater detail in Appendix I. 
Having established that a digital system can be used for 
safety and its behaviour quantified, Section 5 examines the 
problems of designing safe digital systems and the implications 
on encoding, data transmission and data processing. Appendix 
11 analyses the behaviour of several processing configurations 
with regards to safety and reliability. 
Section 6 presents a discussion on how the techniques described 
in preceeding sections can be used in the design of a new 
generation of railway signalling equipment and in automatic 
train operation. 
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Section 7 presents a discussion on how electronic techniques 
can be used to achieve crewless train operation and the 
implications of doing so. This material is presented as an 
extension of the discussion in Section 2. 
Section 8 contains a very short discussion on the socio-
economic implications of innovation, particularly in an 
established transport technology. This discussion is not as 
extensive as the subject deserves, but it is introduced to 
indicate the author's awareness of the existence of the 
problem. 
Appendices III, IV and V are included to describe practical 
aspects of the above work. 
The work on Automatic Train Operation which is the background 
to Section 7, has been carried out by a team under the 
leadership of the author and the ideas on data processing 
presented in Section 4 have also been extensively discussed 
with members of the team at the Railway Technical Centre, 
British Railways Board, DERBY. 
The remainder of the material presented herein is the work 
of the author. 
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2. THE ON-LINE CONTROL OF RAILWAY MOVEMENTS 
This chapter presents a summary of the control system 
organisation of present on-line activities, mainly as a 
background to the original material presented in later 
chapters, although this form of description of a railway 
system has not - to the author's knowledge - been published 
elsewhere. 
2.1. VEHICLE CONTROLS 
The problem of having to control both the power and braking 
in a moving vehicle is undoubtedly familiar to everybody. 
Recent interest in new forms of public transport, such as the 
"personal rapid transport" (PRT), "minitrams" and "automated 
guideways", has resulted in a very large number of articles 
dealing with the dynamics of vehicles and the design para-
meters affecting the dynamics. 
In the case of railways, the wide choice of motive power source, 
e.g. gas turbine diesel, DC electric, AC electric ( and even 
steam), as well as the variety of possible braking systems, 
such as electronically controlled electropneumatic, vacuum, 
tread brakeblocks, disc brakes, etc., make this not only a 
very wide subject, but also a well researched one. 
Because of this, this subject will not be examined in further 
detail in this Thesis. 
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2.2. SAFETY CONTROLS 
In any form of transport, but particularly in the case of public 
transport, there is a need to avoid accidents, particularly 
those liable to produce injury. Railways have always been very 
conscious of this need, and are assisted in this function by 
an independent office, that of the Inspecting Officer of 
Railways, of the Department of the Environment. 
It cen be said that the signalling system carries out two 
fundamentally different functions: 
it selects the required route for each train movement. 
This involves the driving of a suitable device (the 
points) to the required position to allow a train to follow 
a particular path. It is essential to ensure that this 
device cannot move or change state while a train is 
traversing over it, as this situation could result in a 
derailment. 
it provides information to ensure that two trains travelling 
on the same line cannot collide. This spacing of trains is 
achieved by suitable logic and the information is trans-
mitted to the train driver by means of lineside signals. 
In current practice, these display colour lights, and each 
indication contains information concerning the state of the 
track ahead. Figure 1 illustrates some basic relations as 
implemented by British Railways. 
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Both these functions depend on the knowledge of the position 
of each and all trains. This is achieved at present by dividing 
the track into finite length electric circuits, using the rails 
as conductors and relying on the low resistance of wheels and 
axles to short the circuit and interrupt the current flow 
through the relay coil, as shown in Figure 2. It is clear that 
this technique is only applicable to "steel on steel" technology, 
but it is a very simple - and therefore reliable - technique. 
The track occupation, that is the position of trains, is one of 
the independent variables in a logic system the other 
independent variable being the desired path or route - which 
after processing will drive and lock points and signals (a more 
detailed account of the functions performed by this logic and 
its organisation is given in Section 6). This logic is called 
INTERLOCKING, probably because in an earlier implementation 
the logic was performed by mechanical bars with slots, according 
to which position other bars could be moved and locked. Current 
technology uses electromechanical relays which have special 
design characteristics resulting in a very low probability of 
welded contacts - in the language of signalling technicians 
"it can't happen" - and this fact is used to design predictable 
failure response. This subject will be examined in further 
detail in Section 3. 
Figure 3 shows a feedback loop in which the elements mentioned 
above are presented as inputs and outputs to the interlocking. 
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It will be noticed that the train driver, who is responsible 
for observing variable information (i.e. the signal aspect) 
and all fixed information, such as position and values of all 
speed restrictions associated with the track, the position and 
values of all track gradients {affecting braking performance), 
the timetable for his particular train, etc., is not a part 
of the feedback loop. 
2.3. TRAIN REGULATION 
Most known public transport systems other than taxis operate 
according to a schedule (rather than on demand), which is 
usually expressed in the form of a timetable. This timetable 
is usually designed as a compromise between resources, 
commercial viability, demand and social requirements, but the 
relationship between all of these exceed the scope of this 
Thesis. 
Railways throughout the world have spent considerable effort 
and investment in the field of train regulation in order to 
smooth the effects of perturbations in the network, as there 
is abundant evidence to indicate that in many operating 
conditions the system can become "unstable" if perturbations 
exceed a given threshold. This "instability" becomes apparent 
by the propagation of delays and the inability to return to 
the original schedule without drastic action such as the 
cancellation of a number of services. 
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The use of the term "stability" may be inappropriate, as there 
is not sufficient understanding of the control system performance 
of a railway network to determine if there are "poles on the 
right half plane", but in the author's opinion it suitably 
describes the situation. 
The equipment assuming this function is called a Train Describer 
and modern technology allows the use of minicomputers to 
perform the logic required to follow trains as they move along 
their route and display their identity on a suitable panel in 
the operating room of a signalbox (ref. 9). 
A more detailed description of a railway signalling system is 
given in Section 6.1. 
Figure 4 shows another feedback loop, called the "Train Regulation 
Loo~', indicating in it the relations between the Safety Loop 
indicated in Figure 3, the basic role of the Train Describer, 
as well as some of the activities currently being researched 
within the Train Control Group, British Railways R & D Division, 
DERBY. 
The top right hand corner of Figure 4 is a simplified version 
of the Safety Loop shown in Figure 3. (The box labelled I.D.F. 
represents an Internal Distribution Frame, equivalent to an 
electric junction box). 
The full lines in Figure 4 indicate those elements and 
information paths already in use. Dotted lines are used to 
indicate developments now in progress in the Train Control Group 
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(Mathematics Applications Section). 
The following terms may not be self explanatory and are, therefore, 
defined: 
Berth: Any position in which a train description may exist. 
In current practice train descriptions are displayed 
by 25 mm x 50 mm cathode ray tubes on a signalling 
display giving the geographic layout of the area under 
control. 
Fringe box: The most remote signalbox in an area where there is 
a transition in signalbox technologies, e.g. mechanical 
box to electromechanical box. 
Train Reporting by Exception: The reporting of only those trains 
running other than according to the timetable. 
Sequenced Route Commands: Automatic setting of routes according 
to timetabled moves (only possible when all trains are 
running as planned). 
Target Speed/Distance Profile: Specification of an "optimum" 
speed/distance trajectory to minimise any specified 
cost function {delay, energy, etc.). 
2.4. THE PLANNING LOOP 
Figure 5 shows yet another feedback loop, this one concerned 
with the planning activities that take place in "almost real 
time", although the time constants may vary between minutes, 
as in the case of reporting empty or cripple wagons, to a 
week in the alteration of timetable information. 
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The details concerning the reporting and control of the 
vehicle fleet, exceed the scope of this Thesis and are not 
original, except for the case of "failure recovery" in crew-
less train operation, considered in Section 7. 
This feedback diagram is included however, to show that the 
elements presented in Figures 3 and 4 are only a part of 
the overall control activities. It should be clear that data 
processing and simulation have a major role to play in the 
day-to-day operation of a railway network. A more detailed 
description of these loops has been published in Ref. 9. 
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3. SAFETY SYSTEM PRINCIPLES 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
Electronic technologies have, over the last decade, undergone a 
major change, and offer the possibility of implementing systems 
that were impractical or uneconomic only a few years ago. 
It has long been recognised that electronics could play an 
important part in railway signalling, as indicated by such non-
safety applications as the computer based train describer and, 
perhaps even more important, safety systems such as the successful 
all-electronic interlocking at Henley-on-Thames built in the early 
1960's. 
It is felt, however, that with the advent of LSI {large scale 
integration), microprocessor subsystems and the increased 
knowledge of information and reliability theories, there is a 
need for a detailed review and also to establish a "Theory of 
Safety". 
This Thesis sets out to examine and, where appropriate, extend 
the established concepts of safety and failure to safety. In 
addition the techniques available for the design of safe systems 
will be described in section 4. 
Although these topics lend themselves to mathematical techniques 
it is considered that, wherever possible, mathematics and philosophy 
should be treated separately. 
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This section is divided in three subsections, each dealing 
with a separate aspect of the problem: 
The first of these, 3.2, examines the concept of "failure to 
Safety" and analyses the necessary and sufficient conditions 
for a system to exhibit ''failure to safety" properties. 
The second subsection, 3.3, extends the concept of "failure to 
safety" to data, and in particular to data expressed in binary 
form, as it is considered that this extension will permit the 
development of a new generation of safety systems using digital 
integrated circuits. 
The final subsection, 3.4, is both philosophical an~ mathematical, 
as, in order to quantify the "safety'' of a system in a manner 
similar to that of the measurement of system reliability, a 
mathematical model of the Probability of Accident is developed 
and analysed by the use of Markov Processes. 
The definitions of failure to safety, reliability, safety, 
etc. are presented in summary form in the text, where appropriate 
and are listed at the beginning of Appendix I. 
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3.2. FAILURE TO SAFETY 
3.2.1. General. 
The concept of failure to safety, although well established, is ·:ot 
used in a quantitative manner. 
A system is said to be fail-safe if it reverts to a more 
restrictive state for ~ forseeable fault condition or plausible 
combination of fault conditions. 
In practice such behaviour is obtained by the combined use of 
suitable. design principles and suitable components, as illustrated 
by the following two familiar examples: 
Example 1: Failure-to-safety features in a D.C. track circuit. 
Figure 6 shows a basic D.C. track circuit configuration. 
The system is so arranged that a current will flow through the 
relay coil at the receiver end only when the track is clear and 
there is no other probable fault present. 
The relay is assumed to be fail-safe, in the sense that it is 
virtually impossible for its contacts to remain closed in the 
absence of current in the coil {see Example 2). 
The track circuit in Figure 6 has all of the following properties: 
It will detect the presence of a train, as the axles will act 
as a shunt for the current normally flowing through the relay 
coil. The open con~acts thus inrlicate the track is not free. 
~-
- - ··~ • .. -- ') ----
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It will indicate the presence of faults such as: Broken rail, 
broken or disconnected feeds, open circuit relay coil, etc., 
by de-~nergising the relay, giving a "track occupied" indication, 
which is more restrictive than "track clear" • 
. \, 
" 
There are nevertheless situations which can lead to a 
dangerous situation, e.g. a train, the presence of which is 
undetected. Among others, a high resistance between wheelset 
and rail due to the presence of rust or insufficient contact 
pressure are likely examples. 
-·-··---·;'bample 2: Special components. ·.· 
.·.-· 
~-·.· --,.--~ ---··-~ -..-----; .. 
-----· 1... - • --
An example of components with inherent failure to safety 
characteristics can be found in railway signalling relays. In 
_.> •. ~ .. ~. 
"·. 
these both the contact materials and the mechanical construction 
are chosen so as to make the undetected welding of front contacts 
virtually impossible. 
In both examples it is the underlined "virtually" that is specially 
significant since it indicates that there is no absolute certainty 
that such a situation cannot occur, particularly when multiple 
fault situations are considered. 
It is, therefore, necessary to ~ccept that there is a probability, 
albeit small.(with its associated confidence level), that "failure 
to danger" may occur. 
.. • 
"• ...... · 
. :··-. .. :· 
~ . ' ....... 
- .. -------- '"' ___ _...,_ __ _ 
------- . ·--
I 
i 
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3.2.2. Suitability of systems for safety applications - General 
philosphy 
.. ~ .. ·----------. --.--· ---
The flowchart in Figure 7 presents a means of classifying systems 
according to their.characteristics. 
-------
-----
Each stage in the flow chart represents a particular family of 
systems: 
Infinite reliability systems: Although no physical system can 
be said to have infinite reliability, in practice, there are 
systems of which the operational life is extremely short in 
relation to the time between failures. In virtually all the 
applications of this type of system, testing the system 
correctness is an essential part of the procedures until such a 
system becomes operational (good examples of this can be found 
in the space program). 
This approach is obviously not applicable to railway signalling 
with typical operating lives ("mission time" in the reliability 
jargon) in excess of 25 years. 
Ability to detect faults: The lack of this ability implies that 
the operation of the system can be allowed to continue unchecked 
even when faults have occurred. While this may be of little 
importance in an audio amplifier, the obligations imposed on 
public transpor·t operators with regard to safety make it essential 
to protect the system against faults, and the first logical 
requirement is to be able to detect that these have occurred. 
/ 
- 16 -
Ability to take action when faults have occurred: Knowledge 
of a Tailure condition is, per se, not sufficient to 
guarantee that the system is safe, and a suitable executive 
mechanism is required to take the system to a state defined 
as safe. 
Present signalling technology, i.e. relays, combines these 
last two properties in a single component. Thus, absence 
of current on a relay coil (detection) will open the contacts 
{action). 
Type of action taken: Assuming that the previous two 
conditions have been met, there is a choice of course of 
action: 
a. The system can be taken to a "safe" state where further 
action is inhibited until the system has been restored 
to normal operation, or 
b. The system reverts automatically to a standby system, 
known to be operational and ensuring full or partial 
operation. 
It may be of.interest to note that other systems assuming 
safety functions may require a different approach, due to 
fundamentally differing requirements. 
For example, in automatic landing equipment for aircraft, the 
requirement is for correct performance over a very short period 
of time. This permits considerable testing of the equipment 
{and its standby units) prior to its use. This philosophy 
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allows the. system to guarantee a system failure rate.no worse 
than 1 in 107 landings. 
A somewhat similar situation exists in the protection of a 
nuclear reactor, where the requirements are that the system 
must operate correctly when needed, but where there is no a-priori 
knowledge of when it will be needed. Normally, the equipment 
is standing by. 
In railway signalling, the requirement is for continuous operation 
in a large number of logical combinations, and each combination 
must be safe. 
3.3 EXTENSION OF THE CONCEPT OF FAILURE-TO-SAFETY TO INCLUDE DATA 
Figure 7 shows why the ability to detect the presence of faults 
is an essential component in fail-safe systems. These faults 
can be either the result of component failures (permanent) or 
interference (temporary). 
In a data system, and regardless of the nature of the data (e.g. 
binary, decimal or plain language, etc.), the presence of faults 
in the system can lead to any of the following outcomes: 
a. The data given by the system is the same as it would have 
been had the system not been affected by faults - in other 
words, the faults have no effect on the system for the 
particular data being considered. 
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b. The data given by the system can be identified as being 
incorrect by direct observation - in other words, the effects 
of the fault are obvious. 
c. The data given by the system cannot be identified as being 
incorrect - in other words, it appears by observation to be 
plausible. 
Conditions b) and c) can be labelled "Data Failure" and "Data 
Error" respectively, and are equivalent to "Failure to Safety" 
and "lllrong Side Failure". 
The propo~ed definitions are general and are, in a way, more 
restrictive than those currently used in railway signalling, 
as illustrated by the example shown in Figure B. 
A lamp failure giving a single yellow instead of a double yellow 
indication is regarded as safe. Considering the data patterns 
however, such a failure would be classed as a "data error" and 
classified as a "wrong side failure", thus making the definition 
more restrictive, which is, in itself, safe. 
The reason for this approach can be found in "Information Theory". 
In it, many techniques for protecting against the corruption of 
data have been developed and these rely on the knowledge of what 
random process the technique must protect against. 
The success of the protection can be measured in terms of 
probabilities and the probability of detection of faults can be 
made arbitrarily high - at a cost. This will be discussed further 
in Section 4. 
r-------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---· 
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3.4. PERFORMANCE OF SAFETY SYSTEMS 
3 .4 .1 • General 
While failure to safety, as defined in section 3.2., is a well 
established principle and indeed, a fundamental requirement in the 
design of railway signalling equipment, the performance of a safety 
system as a whole, depends on a number of other factors, to be 
described in detail in this chapter. 
In addition, suitable methods for the numerical description of 
these factors - including safety - will be briefly described. 
These techniques are discussed in sufficient detail for. their 
practical use• 
3.4.2. Probability of accident 
The real environment in which a safety system operates includes 
facto=s such as human intervention at various levels, events 
against which the system does not offer protection, etc. All 
these factors combine in practice to create different situations 
which may lead to an accident. 
The most suitable tool for analysis is Probability Theory, since 
ultimately, accidents do not occur by design but rather by 
combinations of unexpected (but often predictable) events. The 
knowledge of an event's probability gives an indication of its 
average frequency (in space or time) and is useful to describe 
the overall performance of a complex system. 
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3.4.3. Factors contributing to the "Probability of Accident" PA 
The simplest- although practical- safety system is that in wh-~h 
only three conditions can exist, and only one at a time. 
a. The system is working correctly. 
b. Th~ system has failed to safety. 
c. The system has failed to danger. 
Figure 9 shows a symbolic representation of these states and the 
possible transitions from one to another. In this simple system, 
it is assumed that it is not possible to pass from one failure 
state to another. 
It is further assumed that, regardless of how much effort is placed 
into considerin9 every conceivable source of failure and protection 
against all contingencies the probability of a failure to danger 
is not zero. After all, every designer must make some assumptions 
in his fail-safe philosophy. 
The diagram in Figure 9 is not complete for the simple reason that 
it does not provide for a return path to state 'a' after failure 
has occurred, that is, reassume normal oreration after a failure 
has been notice~, identified and repaired. Since signalling 
equipment is expected to provide continuous service, Figure 10 
illustrates a somewhat more realistic situation in which the 
influence of both maintainability and the maintenance organisation 
is shown. 
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The need to provide continuous service just mentioned, introduces 
yet another factor, that is, the need to use some form of standby 
system able to offer at least a partial ability to operate the 
system wnile the repair takes place. This situation is 
illustrated in Figure 11, where a' is the temporary (while the 
repair lasts) state of operations. These concepts will be 
discussed in greater detail in Section 4. 
In those cases where this standby system relies on human 
decisions, it can be expucted that the human failure rate will 
be much greater than the corresponding equipment failure rate 
during normal conditions. 
From the~e models, which can be developed to any degree of 
sophistication, it is possible to determine the possibility of 
being, at a given time, at states a, b or c. The techniques 
required for this purpose are given in Appendix I. 
Having defined these three probabilities, namely Pa' Pb and 
P , it is possible to list those situations that can lead to 
c 
an accident. The following situations can be recognised as 
leading to accidents: 
The occurrence of an event for which the safety system 
gives no protection. In the case of railway signalling, 
an example of such an event could be the presence of an 
undetected obstacle on the track. This event can be 
associated with a probability PE. 
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The combination of events such that the correct operation 
of the safety system is insufficient to prevent an accident. 
An example of this could be found ~hen a driver correctly 
applies·the brakes to stop at a signal, but, due to local 
adhesion conditions, goes past the signal and derails. The 
conditional probability PE1/ 1 will be used to represent these 
cases. 
The combination of events such that the incorrect operation 
of the standby system (Figure 11) occurs while the system 
is in a safe failure state. An example of this can be found 
in authorising the wrong train to proceed past a signal at 
danger (~onmore Green, 1969). The conditional probability 
of such an event will be indicated by PE2/ 2• 
The combination of events such that an action which should 
be prevented occurs during the time when the system is in 
a dangerous failure state. The conditional probability of 
such a combination of events will be indicated by PE3/ 3 • 
If PA denotes the 11 probability of accident" and it is assumed 
that the system can only be in one of its three states (normal, 
failed safe, failed dangerous) at any given time, then 
- p E 
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To apply this approach in practice, all the values of these 
probabilities need to be identified. The three conditional 
probabilities can be determined by examining past accident 
records, analysing them by primary and secondary causes and 
expressing the results in the appropriate units. An 
example of a procedure that could be followed can be found 
in Appendix III. 
PE will again be defined by historical records ehere these 
exist, or will need to be defined "a priori" if no other 
information is available and then revised at a later date. 
The probabilities P1 , P2 and P3 depend on the actual design 
and implementation of the system and should, in principle, be 
calculable, as shown in Appendix I. These probabilities 
are identical to P , Pb and P mentioned above. 
a c 
One possible procedure for carrying out these calculations is 
described .in Section 4. 
Before describing the calculation procedures it may be worth 
drawing attention to the fact that, as shown by the equation 
of Probability of Accidents, "Failure to Safety", in the ideal 
case P3 = 0, does not necessarily make PA = 0. 
-~-
4. ANALYSIS OF SAFETY SYSTEMS 
4.1. MATHEMATICAL TECHNIQUES 
In order to quantify the behaviour of a system in which its 
safety features are considered to be essential, it would be 
desirable to develop a mathematical model of their operation. 
Section 3 has discussed the concept of "Failure to Safety" 
and also defined the terms "Data Failure" and "Data Error", 
associated with extending the concept of Failure to Safety to 
include data patterns. 
The diagrams shown in Figures 9, 10 and 11 represent the 
simplest case, where a safety system (or subsystem} can exist 
in only one state at a time and in which the only possible 
states represent normal (correct) operation and fault states, 
one defined as being "safe" and the other as being "dangerous" 
these definitions being a function of the total environment 
in which the safety system operates. 
Transitions from one state to any other will be assumed to be 
caused by failures when moving from the normal state to a 
fault state and by repair procedures when returning to the 
normal states. 
As it is common practice in reliability theory, the differential 
probability of transition from one state to another is labelled 
as a failure rate (or maintenance rate as appropriate) •. The 
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model studied in Appendix I does not depend on these rates 
being constant but assumes their mutual statistical 
independence. 
These failure rates can be determined if the strutture and 
constructional characteristics of the system are known by 
using established techniques, such as Failure Tree Analysis 
and/or Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA). A short 
description of the elements of such analysis is given in the 
first part of Appendix I, but it is not claimed to be original. 
If all the transition rates can be defined, then Markov 
processes can be used to describe the (fault) behaviour of a 
system, and Appendix I examines several simple systems with 
two and three states to show how the whole of Reliability 
Theory can be shown to be a special case of Markov processes. 
Although various reliability terms will be used in accordance 
to their "official" definitions in the British Standards and 
MIL-Specifications, some of the fundamental definitions are 
given here for reference purposes: 
Reliability: 
a) Reliability is the ability of the system/unit in question 
to perform a required function under stated conditions for 
a given period of time. 
' 
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b) Reliability is the probability of survival, i.e. the 
probability that the system/unit in question of age x will 
not fail at time t or before, or, inversely, the probability 
that the product will, without failure, peform a required 
function under given conditions for a certain period of 
time. 
Availability: 
The probability of finding a system in its normal operating 
state at a given moment of time. Availability is a function 
of both failure rates and the repair time. 
The calculation process requires the formulation and solution 
of a set of differential equations of the type 
dP.(t) 
1 
dt 
where P1(t) ts the probability function for each state in the 
system and C is a coefficient matrix for ~he system. As 
the examples in Appendix I illustrate, one attractive feature 
of this method is that it permits the direct evaluation of the 
probability of a Dangerous Failure state. 
The next subsection, 4.2, will examine how the failure rates 
of a system can· be modified by using engineering in its widest 
sense. 
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Safety (not defined in .BS or MIL specifications). 
A system is called "safe" if hazardous events on its operating 
environment, imposed by failures, are excluded with a 
sufficiently high probability, appropriate to its application. 
Such a concept could be formulated as 
where 
s = 1 - p A 
S = System safety 
P = Probability of Accident (as defined in the A 
preceeding text}. 
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4.2. ENGINEERING CONSIDERATIONS 
4.2.1. Safety, Reliability, Availability- Trade-offs 
While it is clear that the ideal system should never fail, the 
long service life expected from railway equipment makes the 
avhievement of this ideal impossible with present technology. 
As the previous section has shown, failure to safety is, by 
itself not sufficient to· entirely_ avoid accidents and in 
fact, the lack of availability (due to failures to safety) 
not only affects the quality of service but also contributes 
to the probability of accident. 
Failure to Safety can be shown, from past accident records 
to make the signalling system so safe that less than 1% of 
all accidents can be directly attributed to signalling failures. 
Those that are, seldom occur in power box controlled areas and 
are due to mechanical component failures, such as failures of 
points locking bars, consisting of steel bars, nuts and bolts. 
It can be further argued that when emergency procedures are 
used (pending restoration of normal operation) the severity 
of the accidents arising from human error is not as high as 
the likely consequences of a wrong side failure. However, this 
is not always the case (e.g. Monmore Green, 1969) and there 
is no doubt that the availability of the system should be as 
high as possible 
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The need to incorporate Failure to Safety features in equipment 
can, in many cases lead to a loss of reliability in the overall 
system, as a certain degree of checking, and therefore, a form 
of additional equipment, is required. This must be accepted as 
unavoidable and in consequence there is a need for identifying 
the best compromise between all the following factors - {even 
though this compromise may well be different for each 
application). 
Technology and standard of engineering: In addition to meeting 
the Failure to Safety requirements, equipment must be designed 
to such a standard (for any given technology) that the maximum 
possible reliability inherent in the particular technology is 
achieved (Reference 3). 
This activity is mostly concerned with providing a suitable 
environment for the operation of the equipment. 
System configuration: The way in which the equipment is organised, 
e.g. whether it is centralised or decentralised, whether it 
incorporates diagnostic aids, how accessible for repair it is, 
etc., has a fundamental influence on failure sensitivity. 
The consequences of a fault may not propagate beyond their 
local environment {e.g. failure of one filament in a two 
filament lamp) or they could, at the other extreme, be 
catastrophic {e.g. total failure of the power supply due to 
a lightning strike). System configuration is an important 
factor in defining its sensitivity to·faults and, in turn, 
the standby requirements. 
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This will be examined further in 4.3. 
Standby arrangements: Usually determined by the failure 
sensitivity, what is available in terms of equipment and manpower 
and what is economically viable. 
All these factors and their interactions can be analysed by means 
of Operational Research techniques. 
4.3. SYSTEM STRUCTURES FOR RAILWAY APPLICATIONS 
Given a specification for a safety system, there will be, in 
addition to the basic operational specification, a number of 
constraints and operational conditions. These will have considerable 
influence on the choice of methods in which the system can be 
structured to meet the desired level of performance in terms 
of availability and safety. Those concerning failure performance 
have already been described and those which depend on functional 
requirements are presented in the flow chart in Figure 12. 
It is assumed that consideration of new technologies is the main 
reason for this study, and this is indicated by the choice of 
starting point in the flow chart. 
- --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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There is a very significant difference between those systems 
which are based on current signalling principles and practice 
and those which are not. In this context, the signalling 
principles in question are the use of fixed block and techniques 
such as track circuits or axle counters to detect the presence 
of vehicles. 
It is implicitly assumed that failure to safety and the locking 
of points cannot be abandoned for railway applications. Whether 
or not lineside signals are retained depends on the proposid 
alternatives (e.g. the Tokaido Line (J.N.R.) does not have line-
side signals, instead it uses continuous cab signalling~ 
If these principles are retained, it is also important to decide 
whether functional enchancements are provided or not. Examples 
of ~uch functional enhancements are systems for track to train 
commu.nications and the possibilities they offer. 
When there are no enhancements, then a technological replacement 
is being considered (the Henley interlocking in Reference 1), 
~nd, as will be shown in subsequent paragraphs, this will 
require both open and closed information loops and the implementation 
can be either as a centralised or decentralised system. 
When functional enhancements are proposed, these can be realised 
either with reporting (other than by a human operator) of the 
system (equipment performance) or without it. The former is an 
open loop system (within a closed loop- see 4.3.1.), and 
examples of this approach are found in the automatic operation of 
the Victoria Line, the BART syste, the Kiruna Mine railway. 
Systems with reporting form closed loop systems, using two way 
transmission of information and centralised processing. An example 
of this approach can be found in the ORE A46 system for Train Control 
(Ref. 17). 
Such a system approach is not only suitable but essential 
when the use of variable length or moving block signalling is 
desired, ss shown in the flow chart. 
4.3.1. Open and closed loop systems 
Systems exhibiting failure to safety performance can be based on 
either ~ closed or an open loop approach - independently of 
whether they are centralised or not. Centralisation is required 
for data processing, rather than for failure to safety. 
This section examines the fundamental features of open loop and 
closed loop systems with regards to failure to safety and develops 
examples of both types of loops as they are found in the existing 
BR Signalling system. 
Examination of figures 13 and 14 will reveal that in both cases 
an executive fail safe system, able to monitor the final system 
output is required (for example able to apply the train brakes if 
there is a fault in the system). 
The main differences between the two approaches exist in the 
following two areas: 
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a. lln the existence of a DIRECT REMOTE CONTROL of the validation 
unit associated with Logic II in the case of a closed loop. 
b. On the existence of a validation unit at the Logic I level, 
this being dependent on the degree of centralisation and the 
amount of data processing in Logic I. In typical decentralised 
situations, such as the LT Victoria Line, there is no data 
processing as such at the Logic I level, but only the 
selection of pre-encoded and validated data• This selection 
must also be fail-safe (Ref. 18). 
Sections 3.4.2. and 4 will make reference to other important 
features related to system structures. 
Figure 15, intended to be self-explanatory, presents a complete 
view of the processes between signalman and driver as they are at 
present. · 
Under normal operation - that is, provided no signals are passed 
at danger and no emergency replacement of signals occurs - the 
signalman cannot tell if the driver has seen, and correctly acted 
upon, a signal. 
Another ~ell-established example of an open loop system is 
illustrated in figure 16 - BR automatic signalling. 
4.3.2. Discrete and Continuous Information 
Another factor playing an impoortant role in the structure of safety 
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systems is whether or not it is essential for information to be 
continuous both in space and time. 
It is also necessary to defferentiate between information relevant 
to safety and information relevant to regulation. This study is 
primarily concerned with the former. 
In the case of traditional signalling circuits, it has always * 
been common practice to rely on the continuous presence of 
information to indicate the correct operation of equipment (based 
on the assumption that the undetected welding of signalling 
relay contacts constitutes an acceptable risk). 
This concept has been extended to electronic circuits, such as 
those used in the Henley interlocking (Ref. 1), where an A.C. 
signal, namely square waves were used to carry information. 
Sampled data control systems and their theory can, 
therefore, be used to show that the continuous presence .of 
information is not strictly required, as Figure 17a indicates 
that in a suitably chosen square wave the signal may be absent 
for half the period, and the failure to safety relies on average 
"information power", rather than on instantaneous values. 
In data transmission systems, the same square wave can be used 
to illustrate a system where information is transmitted serially 
during T and read and interpreted during T ff" It is not 
on o 
strictly necessary for a carrier signal to be present all the time, 
provided the system can recognise that the absence of signal has 
* Except in signalling systems based on the use of axle counters. 
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exceeded a - predetermined - threshold value. This situation is 
typical in "Store and Forward" data communications systems. 
It can be argued that exactly the same thinking can be applied to 
the spacial distribution of information: A train moving along a 
discrete channel, i.e. a communication channel with gaps in 
transmission, will see it, in time, as a "square wave", as shown 
in Figure 17b, with a non-zero information energy contents. 
The tolerable gap for a given system can be determined from 
conventioMal control theory, and more specifically the theory of 
sampled data systems. (This theory is sufficiently well 
established not to have to be included in this study). 
In the case of train control systems, the most important factor 
to take into account is the emergency replacement of a signal. 
(In the existing system, in the event of emergency replacement, 
if the line is occupied between the sighting point of the first 
warning (YY) and the replaced signal, the signalman cannot set a 
conflicting move until a time delay, intended to give the train 
sufficient time to stop or pass the signal). 
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5. DESIGN OF SAFE DIGITAL SYSTEMS 
5 .1. .N!:YJRAL 
The preceeding sections have shown how two major requirements 
lead to the design of safe systems: 
The ability to detect the presence of faults in the system, at 
various subsystem/component levels. 
The ability to take appropriate action following detection. 
It has already been shown that fail-safe circuits based on 
established principles meet both these.objectives. 
This section is concerned with the 'techniques available to 
achieve sufficiently high probabilities of fault detection in 
systems with digital data transmission and processing. 
The first relevant publications in this field were made in 1948 
and 1952: 
- 1948 - Wiener "Cybernetics" {Ref. 4) 
- 1948 - Shannon - A mathematical theory of communication 
{Bell Sys. Tech. Jour.) (Ref. 5) 
- 1952 - van Neumann - Reliable Automata constructed from less 
~eliable modules (Ref. 6). 
and these led to the development of Information Theory • 
The field of information theory is primarily concerned with 
techniques for the handling of information in the presence of 
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random perturbations (i.e. failures and interference), and this 
section will concentrate only on those points which are strictly 
relevant to the problems under discussion. 
There are three distinctly separate aspects in the field of 
protecting against random perturbations: Data encoding, Data 
transmission and finally, Data reduction (processing). 
5.2. DATA ENCODING 
In a quite general sense, the word encoding implies some trans-
formation of input information prior to its entry to a communications 
channel and/or processing system. 
Sometimes the encoding is absolutely essential, such as the 
encoding of plain language and numerical data when the information 
handling system is of a binary nature. Often, the purpose of the 
encoding is to improve the efficiency of the handling of 
information in a predetermined manner. 
When "noise" (in the form of failures or interference) is present, 
the principal aim of encoding is to combat the effects of this 
noise, the idea being that of avoiding the incorrect inter-
pretation of the information. 
An extreme example of this can be found when, in order to transmit 
two binary messages m1 and m2 over a noisy channel, a long string 
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of zeros is attached to m1 and a similarly long string of ones is 
attached to m2 • Thus, even if a high percentage of zeros (or ones) 
is incorrectly received as ones (zeros), there is still room for a 
good message detection. This is obviously not a very efficient 
way of organising a code, and coding theories, matching codes to 
types of interference have been evolved in order to provide 
adequate coding efficiency, necessary to make good use of the 
available channels. 
The effectiveness of codes can be (at least partially) measured 
by their minimum "Hamming Distance" - this can be defined by 
considering the complete "dictionary" of cride words and identi-
fying the two words in it with the smallest number of different 
letters (bits) between them. This number is the minimum 
Hamming Distance (MHO). 
The information redundancy inherent in the code can be used to 
implement a measure of error correction, but the theory shows that 
this is achieved at the cost of a reduced probability of successful 
fault detection*• It is, therefore, recommended that, for safety 
systems, a special analysis of the safety/availability ratio be 
undertaken before_ deciding in favour of error correction. 
For train control systems the encoding process includes two stages: 
encoding numerical information in binary patterns 
providing adequate protection against random perturbations 
(failures and/or interference) by choosing a suitable code. 
*N.B. This is because the check bits cannot be used for~ 
purposes and an effective reduction in the Hamming distance results 
from their us~ for error correction. 
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5.3. DATA TRANSMISSION 
Once data has been encoded as in 4.2, it is usually necessary to 
transmit this data from source to ·destination. The factors that 
need to be considered when selecting a technique for data 
transmission are the following: 
The nature of the transmission medium: This can be of two 
distinct types depending on whether conductive or radiating 
paths are provided {or a combination of bath). 
In conduction, wires, transmission lines, coaxial cables, etc. 
are used to carry the message from one point to another. In 
this case there is an attenuation per unit distance. They are 
also characterised by being directly connected from one specific 
paint to another point so that privacy in the messages can be 
ensured more easily. 
In radiation, the signals are fed to a transmitting antenna 
which converts them into propagating electromagnetic waves. 
A receiving antenna is used to intercept a portion of the ra-
diated energy and two types of attenuation exist: 
One proportional to an inverse power of the distance (often 
inverse square) and 
one proportional to an exponential function of distance 
(negligible in many cases). 
In the case of radio waves, it is mare difficult to guarantee 
privacy due to the often limited spectrum available which can 
lead to interference between messages sent over the same 
frequency band. 
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The requirements of the application, such as whether it is 
necessary (or desirable) to transmit a multiplicity of messages 
over the same channel. In this case it is necessary to 
perform functions on the messages to combine in such a manner 
that their decomposition into the original messages is possible 
at the destination. Two important methods to achieve this are 
time-divisiori and frequency-division multiplexing. 
The nature of the information, e.g. whether it is analogue 
or digital, serial or parallel!, etc. 
In practice the maximum amount of information that can be trans-
mitted over a noisy channel is defined by Shannon's formula 
c = 
s 8 log2 (1 + N ) 
in which C is the information capacity of the channel 
8 is the channel bandwidth 
5/N is the "signal to noise" ratio, expressing the ratio 
of signal power to noise power - assuming white noise. 
which clearly demonstrates the interdependece between the variables. 
Modulation is the technique for transforming information into a form 
suitable for transmission. A large number of techniques exists 
and these use various means to make the most effective use of the 
available signal power within the channel, thus maximising the 
5/N ratio. ·some modulation techniques make it possible to increase 
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the S/N ratio in the demodulator (this is used in high quality FM 
radio transmissions). 
In the transmission of binary data, the performance of the system 
is perhaps expressed better by the bit error rate than by signal 
to noise ratios, since the former also takes into account.other 
sources of corruption such as nonlinearities, etc. 
The combination of the techniques outlined in Section 5.2 and the 
suitable design of the data transmission link can be used to 
( -7 achieve not only a very low bit error rate values of 10 being 
common) but also to reduce the probability of an undetectably in-
correct message ( a wrong side failure) to an arbitrarily small 
value. 
5.4. DATA PROCESSING 
To distinguish it from the processes described under 5.2 and 5.3 
date processing will be associated with computation. 
Computation is associated with the acts of selection and necessary 
destruction of information - Computation is always associated with 
data reduction. 
Computation is, therefore, not only found in applications of 
"digital computers", but also in systems such as railway signalling 
where data reduction takes place, that is, where all input information 
cannot necessarily be reconstructed from the observed output. 
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An example of this is found when considering a railway signal 
showing a Red aspect. This can be due to any of the following 
situations: Track ahead occupied 
Route not set 
Route set but signal approach released 
Track circuit failure in the section ahead 
Lamp failure in the section ahead 
Signalman requiring to contact driver, 
etc. 
It is however due to the increasing use of digital computers and 
current technological developments that there is wide interest in 
fault-tolerant computing, that is, ~n achieving in computing results 
similar to those achievable in data encoding and transmission, as 
described in 5.2. and 5.3. 
While this is a vast although relatively new subject, it has been 
recognised that the original ideas established by Shannon and van 
Neumann already mentioned (Ref. 5) and (Ref. 6) are valid for 
compu~ing systems. 
It is thus possible to define (Ref. 7) a "Computation Capacity" 
equivalent to the·Channel cpapcity discusse~ in 5 .• 3, in this case 
representing the maximum amount of information that can be computed 
by a noisy system, even though the noise may manifest itself as 
the effects of component faiLure. 
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It can be shown that codes can be found such that messages may 
be processed by a given system with arbitrarily small probabilities 
df error. Such coding may take forms as simple as replication, 
where n identical systems are used and checked. 
This is mentioned because current technological developments 
make it attractive to use redundancy in the form of replication 
in ordei to achieve a sufficiently high probability cif error 
detection in computing. 
I I 
While journals such as the IEEE transactions on computers are 
beginning to publish articles on the use of arithmetic codes 
which can be used to achieve "low noise computation", from an 
expediency point of view, replication has a lot to recommend 
it and only one significant drawback: The possibility of 
common mode design faults, i.e. design faults which will produce 
the same (incorrect) result in all units. 
A discussion on the validation of safe digital systems is given 
below, in Section s.s. 
The successful application of replication techniques to safe 
digital systems will depend, to a significant degree, on the 
methods employed to check the system outputs. 
The concepts described in the preceding sections can be applied 
to the analysis of various replicated structures which could 
be put to practical use. 
- 44 -
Three such possible configurations are studied in detail in 
Appendix II, and these are shown to be part of one general 
"family model". The cases analysed are those of a duplicated 
system and a triplicated system. In the latter case, a 
distinction is made between those in which the presence (or 
successful detection ) of the first fault is announced, and 
those in which it is not. 
It can be shown from the mathematical analysis carried out in 
Appendix II that a triplicated structure with announcement of 
a first fault, and which can continue to operate as a duplicated 
system until repair is completed, is a suitable configuration for 
a safe system. 
The analysis in Appendix II assumes that the fault detection 
circuits are fault-free. This is justified in practice if the 
detection circuits are the same as those used in. oractice to 
carry out the logic functions of the systems. * 
These analyses were originally intended for a study of the 
performance of microprocessor systems in which checking of their 
performance is achieved by crossconnecting inputs and outputs 
in such a way that, effectively, each microprocessor checks 
the other ones and, therefore, the conclusions drawn in Appendix 
II apply to this case. 
* N.B. I.e. if the elements of the comparator external to the 
logic can be shown "infinite" reliability, as discussed in 
Appendix II. 
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5.5. BRIEF REVIEW OF RELEVANT TRENDS IN ELECTRONIC TECHNOLOGY 
AND CONCLUSIONS 
With regards to the use of electronics for the design of safe 
and reliable systems, perhaps the microprocessor stands above 
all other current developments as it provides a perfect example 
of the marriage of solid state electronic circuits and computer 
technology in a way that substantiates their key role in the 
field.of electronics. 
Being eminently suitable for processing and digital communications 
systems they contribute to the trend towards distributed 
computing, where each computing activity is broken up into 
segments and dedicated, interconnected processors work on each 
segment. 
The reasons for this trend can be understood from the design 
problems associated with large computer systems. The first of 
these is a control problem since the larger the system, the 
more time and resources are spent deciding what should be done. 
A second problem is a software problem, since as a general rule, 
programs for large systems do not use hardware capabilities 
efficiently, specially so in multiprocessor systems. 
A more ~erious problem in large systems is the almost unavoidable 
presence of "programming bugs" which significantly affect 
performance. 
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As microprocessors and their associated large scale integrated 
circuits can be identified as a bridge between engineering 
design and software programming, their use may accelerate the 
efforts to apply to programs the same kind of discipline as is 
applied in large engineering design efforts, such as the 
hierarchical organisation of design solutions and the precise 
specification of subsystems. This approach is known under 
the general name of "structured programming" and it aims to 
produce programs that are so well organised that they can be 
easily understood, analysed and modified - and naturally 
documented - in other words, it is just the use of sound 
engineering practices for software - even though for the time 
being ultrareliable software remains an R & 0 activity. 
In conclusion, it can be stated that there are considerable 
technological opportunities arising from electronic data 
communications and processing. 
5.6. VALIDATION OF SAFE SYSTEMS 
The practical introduction of any system responsible for safety 
functions presents the designer and user with severe problems, 
namely: 
To ensure that the system is "initially correct", that is, 
that its design and implementation are free of design errors. 
To verify that the failure performance of the system is 
comparable with that expected of it. 
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The latter point is merely a part of reliability engineering 
and is more than adequately discussed in the standard works on 
this subject. 
The first subject is more complex and is, strictly speaking, 
a management rather than an engineering problem. For illustration 
purposes only two schematics, Figures 18 and 19, are given to 
indicate the number and nature of steps involved in initial 
checking. 
Figure 18 applies to a conventional railway signalling system. 
In it, the "Signalling Plan" represents the functional specifi-
cation for the particular location and the "Control Tables", the 
way in which the Signalling Plan is expressed as a logic function. 
Figure 19 applies to a new field of work in railways, related 
to the transmission of information between track and trains, and 
intended to provide Automatic Train Operation and, eventually, 
the option of Crewless Train Operation (see Sections 6 and 7). 
Figure 19 applies specifically to the programming of Read Only 
Memories to be installed at specific locations on the track, 
and containing geographic track information required for 
processing by electronic equipment on the train. 
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6. APPLICABILITY OF ELECTRONIC SAFE SYSTEMS 
PERCEIVED OPPORTUNITIES IN RAIL TRANSPORT 
The techniques described in the preceding sections can be used 
in a number of areas. The present section will describe two 
further important areas of application: 
Railway signalling 
Automatic train operation, 
both in the context of British Rail practice and constraints. 
The information presented here does not constitute a completed 
R & D program, but is regarded instead as a scientific 
formulation of the problem with the proposal for a design 
philosophy. 
6.1. SOLID STATE TECHNIQUES IN RAILWAY SIGNALLING 
Railway signalling has existed and evolved for as long as 
railways have existed. Its main safety requirements can be 
summarised as: 
Preventing the movement of route selection mechanisms 
(points) while a train is passing over them. Failure to do 
this may result in a derailment. 
The movement of points is necessary to allow the routing of 
trains to their intended destinations. 
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Avoiding collisions at railway intersections (junctions and 
crossings) as well as collisions between trains on the same 
line (it is appropriate to remember that the braking distance 
of a high speed train is in the order of 2 km). 
~------ -· ··-···- - -A further requirement exists in that the above two conditions 
shall be met even when there are equipment failures in the 
signalling system. 
The three main functional elements in the signalling system are: 
a. The interface to signals (in modern systems, colour lights) 
and points (driving an electrinc machine) as well as the 
interface from various information sources such as track 
circuit receivers used for train detection, filament proving 
circuits, point locking proving, etc. 
b. The communication of this information to the logic circuits 
which operate on it. These communications can take the 
following forms: 
Direct cabling , usually used in all local circuits and 
automatic signals (those which do not require centralised 
logic). 
Failsafe multiplexed links. 
Non-failsafe multiplexed links. 
-~-
The use of failsafe multiplexing currently relies on the 
use of mechanical oscillators of frequencies chosen so as 
I 
to differ from supply harmonics under virtually all conditions 
and offer the possibilities of very high centralisation of 
the logic and significant reductions in cabling. 
Two such signalboxes exist in British Railways~ Trent and 
Saltley in the London Midland Region. 
Non-failsafe multiplexing has been used successfully for 
many years and safety is assured through remote failsafe 
logic, "remote or·local interlocking". 
c. The interlocking is a logic function and can be regarded 
as a crude form of computer, peforming comqinatorial and 
sequential logic, according to the simplified flowchart in 
Figure 20. These logic functions are performed by 
specially designed relays (Reference B) designed to exhibit 
a very high degree of failure to safety. The flowchart is 
considered to be self-explanatory. 
The overall physical organisation of a railway signalling 
system is shoen in Figure 21 and in it all the elements 
previously described are indicated (see Reference 19). 
The current cost of railway signalling approaches £40,000 
per mile if all elements, such as cable trenches and buildings, 
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are included. A cost breakdown, however, indicates that the 
major components are: 
Labour · SO% 
Cabling 25% 
Equipment 25% 
The use of electronics in a way similar to that described in 
Section 5 can make a significant contribution to cost savings, 
not only because of present costs, but also because the future 
cost of special components, such as railway relays, will continue 
to rise, whereas the cost of solid state circuits will continue 
to decrease as the market size for them grows. 
A further benefit will accrue from the inherent reliability of 
solid state techniques and from the possibility of using 
equipment redundancy to achieve a higher operational 
availability - which will then be limited by the performances 
of interface equipment, such as point machines. 
A possible realisation of an electronic railway signalling 
system is shown in rigure 22. 
As shown in rigure 21, railway signalling is a distributed 
logic system and logic functions at each location have an 
influence on other locations. This implies both data 
communications and data processing, as previously discussed. 
. . 
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The elements shown in figure~ are intended to show how digital 
integrated circuit technology can be used to advantage. The 
box labelled "Data Acquisition System" represents the 
processes of amplification and filtering, modulation and 
demodulation and finally coding and decoding with a check of 
the data validity as discussed in Section s. 
The box labelled "Processing System" actually performs the desired 
logic functions and, through suitable interfaces, drives the 
appropriate signalling equipment and reports on the state of 
elements such as points, signal lamp filament current, track 
circuit occupation, etc. 
The availability of Read Only Memories offers considerable 
advantages as it allows for the pre-encoding of standard messages 
(in a manner similar to that shown in figure 19) and it is, 
therefore, envisaged that pre-encoded messages could be used 
to reduce the probability of incorrect data {from processing) 
being given a valid transmission code and incorrectly interpreted. 
6.2. AUTOMATIC TRAIN OPERATION (ATO) 
Despite the fact that ATO has been in use for several years 
by several urban transport authorities, such as in London 
Transport's Victo~ia Line, the San Francisco BART system, etc., 
no such system is yet in operation in main line railways 
anywhere in the world (see list of references). 
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The main reasons for this can be found in the following: 
Railways operata a wide range of train types, e.g. locomotive 
hauled, multiple units, with varying lengths, different 
traction and braking systems and different braking 
distances. 
This effectively rules out all the "simple" ATO systems 
relying on programmed operation which only work well when the 
rolling stock has uniform characteristics. 
Main line railways operate a complex service with·different 
station stopping strategies (all stations, semifast, express, 
etc.) which further complicates the operation of an ATO 
system. 
Main line railways in the busier areas of the network are 
very sensitive to perturbations and sophisticated techniques 
for train regulation strategies are a necessary element in an 
ATO package. 
It is only very recently that both computer technology and 
the understanding of the problem have come sufficiently close 
together to allow for satisfactory solutions. 
These reasons indicate that the simplest form of ATO system 
which would be applicable to main line railways will contain 
all of the following elements: 
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A track to train communications link capable of transmitting 
sufficient information for safety~ regulation and preferrably 
with a speech option. 
The safety element should be able to determine the maximum 
permissible speed for given track and train characteristics 
and should never produce information which is not applicable 
to a particular railway movement. 
The regulatory element should provide for the selection of 
station stops information and to execute the stopping with 
a specified accuracy. In addition, regulatory information 
in the form of desired point-to-point timings or optimum 
speed profile should be processed and communicated to the 
appropriate train. 
Figure 23 indicates how these objectives could be met taking 
the present day railway as the starting point and the elements 
in it relate to the feedback loops discussed in Section 2. 
The socio-economic arguments for ATO are presented in Section 
a. 
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7. CREWLESS TRAIN OPERATION 
The previous sections have been primarily concerned with the 
safety aspects of railway controls. Several railway admini-
strations have shown that a certain degree of automation could 
be achieved using the existing infrastructure (Reference 17). 
Looking further to the future it can be anticipated that public 
demand for a cheap, reliable, fast and frequent transport service 
may require a much higher degree of automation due to the 
difficulties of meeting all the. above objectives using the 
present approach. 
It is well-known that the use of computers and related 
technologies has revolutionised many process industries, and today 
there are fast, accurate sensors, computing facilities adequate 
for simulation and control to the point that "optimisation" of 
the process is a realistic possibility. 
There are nevertheless many activities which have been uninfluenced 
by these developments because of labour relations implications, 
the high cost of advanced automation systems and/or some systems 
which are so complex that proper models for them have not yet been 
produced. Another limitation is the quality of transducers 
performing (human) sensing functions. 
This does not preclude the possibility that a ''machine" will be 
programmed to replace a human operator in all aspects and it is 
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suggested that the best way to combine the capabilities of the 
human and electronic technology is through an evolutionary approacch, 
introducing automatic control with a definite and achievable 
return on investment at each stage. 
The four basic stages in this evolution are as follows: 
Complete human control: The human operator is the sole controller 
of the process, including measurement and/or estimation of 
parameters and the appropriate use of the controls. Electronic 
systems may be present but in a purely informative capacity. 
This situation is found in today's train driving. 
-Machine -mon·rtoringu a-human- operator: As a partial 
substitute of the human operator, a control system releases the 
operator from tedious or repetitive tasks. 
When the special abilities of the operator are needed, the system 
could be used "in parallel" with the operator, in an advisory 
capacity. The operator is still the decision maker and also 
activates the controls, but there is cooperation between man and 
machine. 
This stage permits the progressive development of models in order 
to mimic the human decisions in those situations not yet 
automated. 
Such a stage in the implementation of an automation system is 
-~-
acceptable and economic, because the operator can work as usual 
and the system is working without interfering. Experience in 
fields other than transport has shown that when automation 
systems provide an acceptable level of control, operators are 
willing to delegate many functions to the automatic system. 
The system described in 6.2. could be introduced as a "Speed 
Advisory System" in order to validate its operation prior to 
the next stage. 
Operator supervising machine: This is the next step in 
the evolution towards full automation, in which the operator 
acts as transducer, feeding his readings, specially those vari-
ables which are difficult to quantify or measure (qualitative 
or subjective). 
Full automation: At this level the automation system measures, 
decides and actuates the control. A human operator is now 
responsible for action in the case of system malfunction. 
Such an evolutionary implementation has several advantages. From 
an economic ana social point of view, the automation system which 
is introduced is not immediately aimed at removing the operator, 
but at helping him improve productivity by selecting a better 
operating mode. The problem of human acceptance of the automation 
system is much lighter than in the case of a drastic technological 
change. 
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No excessive investment is made in any step without having proven 
the success of the preceeding step, thus justifying the cost, even 
if the ultimate objectives of full automation are never achieved. 
The step by step nature of the approach simplifies the practical 
implementation. Instead of designing a new system to replace 
the old one; the target is to move from the old system to the new 
one by a series of stages. The role of the operator changes little 
by little and each step begins only when both the automation system 
and the operator are ready. 
7.1. FORMULATION OF THE PROBLEM 
For the successful design of an automation system it is desirable 
to classify the different classes of tasks which the system must 
cater for prior to allocating the different tasks to a particular 
struct'ure within the system. 
Functional tasks can be classified into NORMAL OPERATION tasks and 
FAILURE MODE tasks: 
7.1.1. Normal operation tasks 
These can be simple, complex and vigilance tasks: 
Simple tasks: Simple tasks are those implying a sequence of well 
defined operations and involving a minumum of decision making. 
-~-
Complex tasks: Complex tasks imply a sequence of moderately well 
defined operations, but involving a significant degree of decision 
making. Complex tasks are characterised by greater variability 
in the sequences to be performed. Complex tasks account for a 
large proportion of the operator's job in most industrial processes. 
Vigilance tasks: The process operator monitors the operation and 
integrity of the process and of the control system and is the 
main component in dealing with malfunctions. As the degree of 
automation increases the proportion of vigilance tasks concerned 
with monitoring tends to grow. 
On most industrial processes, some automatic equipment exists 
which scans process variables and equipment status for "out of 
limit" conditions and gives alarm signals. Response to anambiguous 
alarm signals is part of the process operator's job, but the overall 
vigilance tasks involve rather more, as there is a wide range of 
information to which he is required to respond, even though this 
information is complex, with ill-defined out of limit conditions, 
weak and noisy, infrequent and unexpected. 
The vigilance tasks involve the recognition of the development of 
undesirable process conditions before actual alarms occur, the 
detection of malfunctions in equipment and instruments, even though 
there is· no explicit alarm. This is clearly a problem in pattern 
recognition and decision making. 
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7.1.2. railure mode tasks 
These can be Control, Emergency, Isolated events and Total system 
collapse. 
Control tasks: These usually follow from the above vigilance function 
and consist of determining-whether a control intervention is required 
and/or possible, to compensate for malfunction. 
Emergency tasks: The process system is sometimes required to deal 
with an emergency, and although shutdown systems (fail safe as in 
Section 3), which protect against the pr~cipal hazards are 
provided, emergency situations do occur and the •ystem or its operator 
must deal with them. 
The demands made on the operator by an emergency vary considerably. 
In some cases it will be sufficient for him only to execute a well 
formulated and practiced drill; in others he may have to develop 
a quite new strategy and there may be very many different 
situations. 
Isolated tasks; The possibility exists that unusual acts may 
occur which affect the performance of the system - such as sabotage, 
or vandalism. 
Total system collapse: This may occur due to a fortuitous 
combination of events and a form of standby system is required, 
which is totally independent of the main control system. 
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7.2. TASKS 
Crewless train operation differs from Automatic Train Operation 
as described in Section 6.2. (ATO) in that the latter retains a 
"train operator" on board train, who also has the option - and 
is in some situations required - to change to a "manual" driving 
mode. 
In recent years social and employment trends in large conurbations 
have indicated that there may well be a case for crewless train 
operation not only on economic grounds, but mainly based on the 
need to maintain a service of sufficient quality. 
This section will examine the engineering problems and identify 
both the structure of a suitable control system as well as the 
technological areas of opportunity for electronic engineering. 
Based on the analysis presented in Section 7.1 the following can 
be identified: 
Simple tasks: All the following, concerned with the operation of 
vehicle controls and safe operation are considered to be simple 
tasks: 
Determination of maximum permissible 
speed Vmax 
Determination of optimum desired speed 
Proving that V t ~ V before execution op ._. max 
Complex tasks: 
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Acceleration and braking controls within 
permitted constraints. 
Accurate stopping at stations 
Door controls (open/close, obstructed, etc.) 
Train starting. 
Permissi~e operation ~~re than one vehicle/ 
train within one block.section) 
Continuous evaluation of braking (adaptive 
adjustment) 
Obstacle detection 
Definition of train parameters (length, 
braking characteristics, etc.) 
Vigilance tasks: These are concerned with the observation and 
reporting possibly be exception of vehicle status affecting, 
amongst others, the following: 
Braking system: 
Traction system: 
Status.(adaptive or conventional) 
All failures and loss of performance 
Variations in nominal applications and 
release times 
Wheel slip and slide - wheel flats, etc. 
Fuel status (and/or electric traction voltage 
and current) 
Field Current (in electric traction) 
All failures in the traction controls or motors 
Cooling system performance, etc. 
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Auxilliary systems: Lighting, heating, ventilation, door controls, 
load sensing valves, emergency speech 
communication link, quality of ride, fire, 
smoke, etc. 
Control tasks: In the case of a fully automated passenger vehicle, 
the following can be recognised as control tasks: 
Braking: 
Traction: 
Ancillary systems: 
Remote switching of the adaptive braking 
Remote application of brakes. 
Remote switching of emergency power source 
(e.g. batteries} in case of main supply 
failure or equipment failure. 
Remote control to prevent/allow detraining of 
passengers at stops other than permitted 
(scheduled) stations; allowing manual operation 
takeover -in certain circumstances 
Taking appropriate action if vehicle is 
overloaded (or empty}. 
Emergency tasks: The following are considered to be emergency tasks: 
Dealing with rolling stock failure, including 
determining whether failed vehicle can be 
assisted (i.e. has it derailed or are the 
brakes fully applied and cannot be released) 
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Dealing with fires, smoke, running into 
obstructions on the track, having passed the 
station without stopping, passenger operating 
emergency brake, etc. 
Isolated events: System response and operation in the case of 
attempted suicide, vandalism, sabotage, accident (e.g. at a level 
crossing), etc. 
7.3. SYSTEM STRUCTURE 
A system structure similar to that described in Section 2 
and shown in Figure 24 , can be shown to be adequate for a crewless 
train operation system evolved from the automatic train operation 
system described in Section 6.2. 
The system structure required for crewless train operation is 
shown in Figure 24, and is clearly based on the structure already 
shown in Figure 23. The most significant differences between ATD 
and CTD are the need for: 
Specially designed rolling stock to allow for the monitoring of 
variables and reporting of off-limit conditions in a fail-safe 
manner where appropriate. 
The most important of these parameters are shown in Figure 25 
and purely as an illustration of the magnitude of the problem, 
Figure 26 presents a simplified flow-chart of the requirements 
for the automatic door controls in a crewless rail vehicle. 
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A central organisation to which all malfunction or off-limits 
information is reported and which is also responsible for the 
overall ~anagement of the crewless system. 
Among the most important activities which will have to be 
carried out with much tighter controls than at present, are the 
following: 
Track maintenance planning and updating of Permanent Speed 
Restriction values in the train control system {affecting the 
safety of operations) 
Track equipment test schedules and maintenance programs. In 
addition, also the real time location, status and fuel situation 
reporting. 
Coaching stock: Equipment test schedules and maintenance 
programs. Real time control of location, load status, 
auxilliary equipment, updating of train characteristics for 
train control purposes. 
The above will supply the necessary information for statistical 
analysis on passenger flows, reliability, rolling stock utilisation, 
demand patterns~ etc. 
It is anticipated that such a system could be made operational 
before the end of this century. 
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8. SOCID-ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 
All t~e recent trends in housing, work and leasure patterns, 
manufacture and consumption, etc., contribute to highlighting the 
role of mobility in a modern industrial society. 
In recent years, transportation has become increasingly contra-
versial due ~o traffic congestion, pollution, energy considerations 
and last but not least, the economics of transport. The cost of 
providing new roads, bus services and rail services is continually 
increasing, reaching the point where the quality of service suffers. 
This inevitably reflects on both the quality of life and the 
national economy. 
While the object of this study is not concerned with making a case 
for rail transportation, the systems discussed for possible future 
use do represent substantial investment and will, in the case of 
automation, introduce new factors. It is, therefore, important 
to assess the implications of these techniques in order to, at least, 
identify major parameters and to recognise, at an early stage, whether 
or not there are major obstacles that could inhibit these developments. 
The three basic areas for investigation are: The user, the 
operator and the organisation and the country as a whole. 
8.1. AUTOMATION AND THE USER 
Automation and mechanisation are finding more and more applications 
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where the general public makes use of automatic equipment. 
Examples of this are found in coin-operated vending machines, 
washing machines, and more recently electronic cash dispensers 
and readouts in shops and libraries. 
The main difficulties which have to be recognised by the designer 
are: 
That the equipment will be abused or misused by the user, in 
the shape of bent or foreign coins, disregard of instructions, 
use of force, etc. 
That the equipment will be subject to malicious damage if it 
is totally unattended. 
In the case of railways both these situations exist already and 
may well be aggravated. On the other hand, the point is being 
reached where public demand for cheap, fast, realiable and frequent 
transportation cannot be satisfied without the use of automation. 
In the case of crewless train operation (CTO) there will be a number 
of ergonomic engineering problems requiring attention, associated 
with the lack of railway personnel on the train to provide 
information and control both under normal circumstances and under 
failure conditions. This situation is not entirely unlike that 
found in automatic lifts. 
Further automation and mechanisation aids can be expected in the 
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supply of information concerning train services as well as the 
issue and verification of travel tickets. 
In the case of freight movements, the ability of the railway to 
offer genuine door-to-door services is limited to private sidings, 
and thus only to customers placed relatively close to railway lines. 
Provided the railway can reduce transit times between random pairs 
of terminals, and this is very much subject to a change in operating 
practice for wagonload and parcel freight services, there is 
considerable scope for increasing the railways' share of the freight 
market. 
8.2. AUTOMATION AND THE OPERATOR 
Is it really possible to design man completely out of an 
automated system? 
From the point of view of equipment and hardware, there are no 
major obstacles, but the practicality of this does not appear 
feasible in the very short term. 
In general terms, a human operator is better able to anticipate 
trends and interpret relationships which may not be easily 
defined in a computer's program. He can also deal with small 
adjustments for unprogrammed changes in operating conditions. 
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ror as long as the human operator remains part of the 
system - during which the term "mechanisation" may be 
less misleading than "automation" - the man/machine inter-
face should be designed taking into account man's 
limitations and strength - showing all that is relevant 
without overloading the operator. 
The process of mechanisation must be viewed in conjunction 
with the problems of staff recruitment, availability 
and training, since these will greatly affect the degree 
of mechanisation which is compatible with job satisfaction 
and the operator's ability to deal with unexpected events. 
It is in this area that there is potential for major 
social or industrial disruption, but this could be avoided 
by redesigning jobs that may not be eliminated, in order 
to make them less routine, less tedious and, where 
applicable, less dangerous. 
Seen in the context of railway services, the problem of 
automation or mechanisation and the operator, leads to the 
following options: 
a. To reduce the number of staff in the organisation 
without visible change in output 
-~-
b. To redistribute staff the other jobs (e.g. there is a shortage 
of maintenance staff at the time of carrying out this study). 
c. To offer a new form of business leading to increased revenue 
with lower unit costs. 
Option c can be clearly _ seen to be the best choice, while elements 
of b could also be beneficial, subject to the constraints of 
~mplementing these decisions in a real world where both politics 
and organised labour exist. 
To assist decision making, it is also desirable to examine the 
differences between Efficiency and Productivity, where the former 
depends on how resources are used and the latter largely on the 
tools available to carry out the job. 
Examples of areas where efficiency can be improved in any large 
organisation are: 
Time required to reach a decision (delay = increased cost) 
Existence of long-term investment and policy plans. 
Avoidance of a "saving regardless of cost" attitude 
Overheads. 
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Increases in productivity should ideally be accompanied by an 
increase-in the share of the market if there is a social need 
... to. avoid ·red~dan'~!es and consequent contributions to unemploymer ,t. 
Many recent developments in British Railways, such as the 
comissioning of the TOPS (Total Operations Processing) System 
are productivity aids, in this particular case to improve wagon-
load freight traffic. 
8.3. AUTOMATION AND THE RAILWAYS 
The railway as an organisation have, in addition to the day to day 
operation of the railway network, the responsibility for planning 
and marketing services and investment. 
Since virtually all the investment capital is supplied by the 
Government (this situation being almost universal) it is necessary 
to investigate how this investment will affect both the railways 
and the nation as a whole, so that investment priorities can be 
allocated. 
The effects on capital and manpower resources which are a 
consequence of innovation are many and complex, and Figure 27 
represents a simplified analysis of cause and effect. 
In order to briefly illustrate the nature and scope of such analysis, 
the following factors have been identified as being benefits 
arising from the implantation of automatic and crewless train operation: 
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8.3.1. Benefits of Automatic Train Operation 
A study carried out by the author for the British Raiways 
Board indicates that implementation of Automatic Train 
Operation in all the important suburban railways under 
British Raiways operation would result in minimum savings, 
indicated below: 
Reduced staff training: By reducing route learning 
requirements by at least SO%, applicable to all drivers 
of suburban trains. At 1975 costs this represents £1,5 
million per annum. 
Improved staff utilisation: By reducing stress, hence 
improving working conditions and permitting a longer shift. 
At 1975 costs this represents £2,5 million per annum. 
Accident prevention: By reducing the probability of human 
error~ Considering equipment damage costs only, a nominal 
figure of £1 million per annum is assumed. 
Energy conservation: Studies carried out by other 
Administrations (References 20 and 21 ) as well as by 
British Railways revealed that energy savings of 15 to 30% 
could be achieved by automatic train operation by optimising 
the rate of acceleration and taking full advantages of the 
train's kinetic energy. 
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Since approximately £45 million were spent in 1975 on energy 
for suburban ~ail services, the possible savings represent 
between £7,5 and £15 million at current prices. 
If the possibility of energy costs rising in ~eal terms is 
also considered, it can be shown that ATD can be cost-
effective on energy conservation grounds alone. 
8.3.2. Benefits from Crewless Tra~n Operation 
In addition to the benefits listed under 1 above, the 
following apply: 
Increased revenue as a result of improved quality of service 
(i.e. increased frequency of service, more seats/hour, etc.). 
Considering that the 1974 season ticket revenue was £75 
million, an increased revenue of £5 million is assumed. 
Reduced operating costs: As a result of a reduction in 
suburban driving staff, reduction in overtime payments, 
etc. This is conservatively estimated at £10 million per 
annum. 
In addition other benefits can be listed, but these are not 
"eco~omic" in the sense that they will not app~ar in the 
"Profit and Loss" accounts of the Railways Board. Examples 
of these are: 
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Social benefits from diverting traffic from road to rail. 
Reduced need to carry out suburban road improvement schemes 
- Time savings to passengers, etc. 
Etc. 
There are techniques and established procedures to quantify 
these benefits (Reference 22), and these are almost always 
used in the justification of road improvement schemes. This 
will not be attempted here as the resulting figures are 
greatly in excess of the economic benefits listed above and 
as such are likely to add to the source of long arguments. 
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9. CONCLUSIONS 
Railways are already major users of electronic equipment 
(Reference 9) and this situation is clearly irreversible. 
The problems of electronic equipment design and reliability 
have been considered for several years and are reasonably 
well understood. 
To date, however, electronic equipment has not been extensively 
used for applications where failure to safety is required. 
This thesis contains the mathematical basis for the numerical 
evaluation of safety systems operating in the "real world", i.e. 
subject to both failures and maintenance. The mathematical 
techniques extend established reliability methods and have 
been applied in practice within British Railways. 
The mathematical techniques extend to the well known concepts 
of "failure to safety" to include data, by introducing the 
definitions of "error" and "failure". 
Two further new concepts are introduced: The first one is that 
Failure to Safety may not be the best way to describe the 
performance of a safety system, and a "Probability of Accident" 
is postulated, to take into account other factors such as 
human error and the nature of standby systems where these are 
used. 
, ....... 
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The second concept is that the mathematical description of a 
safety system can be achieved through the use of Markov processes. 
This Thesis also contains guidelines for the application of 
these techniques and recommendations concerning the design 
of safe digital systems. 
Two appendices included in this Thesis illustrate the more 
practical aspects of the techniques described as applied to new 
structures (Appendix II) and an existing system (Appendix Ill). 
Apart from the electronic aspects, control is a fundamental part 
of railway operations and Section 2 shows the railway as a set 
of independent but hierarchically organised control systems. 
It should be clear to the reader that this representation is an 
oversimplification and all attempts at developing a universal, 
comprehensive model of the railway network undertaken to date 
have failed. The purpose of presenting this view is, however, 
to indicate major interrelationships and their merging points. 
This is illustrated in Section 7, where crewless train operation 
is discussed as an example. Section 6 formulates how the 
techniques described in this Thesis could be applied to the 
next generation of railway signalling equipment. Appendix IV 
gives a cost benefit analysis. 
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Section 8 presents a short discussion of the implications of 
innovation on this scale for the user, the operator and the 
organisation as a whole and is the result of experience gained 
over several years of industrial experience in the field of 
innovation. 
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APPENDIX I 
MATHEMATICAL TECHNIQUES FOR THE ANALYSIS Of SAFETY SYSTEMS 
List of Symbols: 
: Union 
: Intersection 
f , 'f , -</> : Function of 
: Belonging to 
/'ij : Failure rate related to the transition from 
State 1 to State j 
Jlji : Repair rate related to the transition from 
State j to State 1. 
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APPENDIX I 
MATHEMATICAL TECHNIQUES FOR THE ANALYSIS OF SAFETY SYSTEMS 
DEFINITIONS 
RELIABILITY · 
a. Reliability is the ability of the system/unit in question 
to perform a required function under stated conditions for 
a given period of time. 
b. Reliability is the probability of survival, i.e. the 
probability that the system/unit in question of age x will 
not fail at time t or before, or, inversely, the probability 
that the product will, without failure, perform a required 
function under given conditions for a certain period of time. 
AVAILABILITY 
The probability of finding a system in its normal operating 
state at a given moment of time. Availability is a function 
of both failure rates and the repair time. 
FAILURE TO SAFETY 
A system is said to exhibit failure to safety characteristics, 
or simply to be "fail-safe", if it reverts to a more restrictive 
state for any forseeable fault condition or plausible combination 
~ fault conditions. 
SAFETY 
A system is called "safe" if hazardous events on its operating 
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environment, imposed by failures are excluded with a sufficiently 
high probability, appropriate to its'application. 
Such a concept could be formulated as 
S = 1 - PA 
where S = System Safety 
PA= Probability of Accident. 
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APPENDIX I 
MATHEMATICAL TECHNIQUES FOR THE ANALYSIS OF SAFETY SYSTEMS. 
I.1. GENERAL 
The problem of technological innovation always presents the 
problems of evaluating system reliability and safety, comparing 
specific characteristics of alternative designs objectively, 
evaluating and estimating the contributions to system 
unreliability and unsafety and identifying weak or critical 
elements in the design. 
A number of techniques can be applied to obtain answers to all the 
above, and are based on the theory ~f Probabilistic Reliability. 
It will be assumed here that the reader is familiar with the 
fundamentals of these techniques. References 10 and 11 
are recommended for more detailed information. 
In any'form of probability analysis, a systematic approach is 
essential. A distinction can be made between quali- and 
quantitative analysis. 
The qualitative analysis implies the decomposition of a system 
into subsystems and components, followed by the determination of 
possible systems operating and failed states. One possible analysis 
technique, well-known to signal engineers, is now called "Failure 
Mode and Effe6t Analysis" (FMEA). In it, the possible failure 
mode of each component is used to analyse the failure mechanism of 
the system. (Ref. 12). A short example is also given in Appendix 
Ill. 
- 82-
This appendix will examine how such a model can be enhanced by 
the use of Markov processes, to provide a quantitative analysis 
and how the latter, in turn provides information·for estimating 
the "probability of accident". 
Simple examples of application are given in Appendices II and III. 
1.2. BASIC CONCEPTS 
It will be assumed that the correct operation of the system 
depends on the correct operation of its component parts, and the 
operating behaviour of a component or system can be described 
by examining all possible operating and failed states and by 
considering the probability that a component or system will be in 
a particular state at a certain time. 
The set of all observable system.states Si' assumed to be finite 
in number (i = 1, ••••••• , n) is defined as Z (see Figure 28). 
This set can be partitioned into two basic subsets: Q (correct 
operational states) and F (failure states). It has already 
been shown in Section 3 that subset F can be further subdivided 
into safe and dangerous subsets. This study will return to 
this subdivision in the following pages. 
In the following analysis, it is intended to relate the set of 
observable system states with the elementary states ~f each 
component, E.• 
• Note. Each "component" may be' a s1,1bsystem, and the subdivision 
can thus be repeated as many times as necessary. 
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For this purpose the following statements and stages need to 
be followed: 
Subsets Q and F are related by the following equations: 
au F = z 
Q n F = 0 (disjoint) 
For each k (see Figure 35) (i- 1, •••••• , n), the set of all 
k 
observable substate states Xik (ik = 1k' ••••• , bk) is defined as 
Ek, and this ea~ also be partitioned into two (or more) subsets: 
k * Ea, subset of all operable component states 
E~, subset of all inoperable component*states (for all failure modes) 
for which the relations 
Ek (\ Ek = 0 (disjoint) Q F 
Each possible state in a component can be described as an 
"elementa~y state" £, and there is a functional relationship 
between each possible state and each observable state: 
k 
xik = f (£~k) k = 1' ..... ' m 
ik = 1' ..... , bk 
k 
xik € Ek rk = 1 t ..... , gk 
* Could be a subsystem. 
l 
I 
I 
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If gk ) bk' then clearly several elementary states t~k are 
k 
assigned to one and the same observable subsystem state Xik 
(this is analogous to the loss of information due to computation 
defined in Section 4.3). 
Similarly, a functional relation exists between observable 
component states and observable system states, that is: 
s. f z 
J 
and a system function r may be defined to relate the observable 
system states to the elementary states £rk 
= \D (£1 1 , ••••• , f.m ) I r rm 
{by extension of the previous argument, several elementary states 
k frk may be assigned to one and the same observable system state 
s j). 
As a system state is defined by m elementary states, 
1 k (£r1' ••••• , lrk' ••••• , (.m ), rm 
the transition from one system state to another, i.e. from operational 
to failed, is determined by elementary state transitions. An 
elementary state transition will be assumed to be the consequence 
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of a certain event If~, occurring at discrete but random times, 
t 9 , v • 1, z, .••.• 
These e~ents can be: 
component failure 
external {and statistically independent) interference 
maintenance time 
repair, etc. , 
which will be characterised by their own probability distributions. 
In order to carry out an "FMAE" analysis and the appropriate 
reliability calcuiations, (where "reliability" refers to the 
theory, and include numerical descriptions of time-to-safe 
failure and time-to-dangerous failure), the following information 
is necessary: 
The number gk of elementary states £ for each basic component 
The number bk. of elementary states X for each subsystem 
The probability of occurrence 
. k 
of each xik 
The system structure, in this case, defining all the system states 
Sj and allocating them as Qj or Fj. 
A short example is given in the first part of Appendix Ill. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
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I.3. STEPS IN THE EVALUATION OF SYSTEMS PERFORMANCE 
(reliability and safety) 
The systems of interest to this study can be classified into three 
classes: 
a. non-repairable systems {at least during their mission) 
b. partially repairable systems (those which allow repair of 
certain subsystems/components without interrupting system 
operation by'means of redundant parts) 
c. repairable systems (as above but covering the whole system). 
The evaluation steps are the following: 
1. Analysis of the system structure: 
a. without considering repair - Comparison of various types 
of redundancy 
b. considering the repair of certain - specified - components 
c. all components repairable. 
2. Sensitivity analysis leading to the identification of critical 
subsystems/components or parameters. 
{In systems such as in 1.c above, the analysis must include 
the maintenance organisation and procedures). 
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From all the range of models available for analysis, those based 
on the use of Markov processes are considered to be the most 
suitable. 
"Markov processes" became firmly established in statistical 
techniques in the mid-50's, and are, essentially a t~chnique for 
dealing with the "equation of motion" in systems where a large 
number of states can exist and in which the transition from one 
state to another is random. This randomness is expressed by the 
requirement that the probability of transition from state i 
to state j depends only on i and j. 
The main reason why Markov processes (which can be easily shown to 
encompass the whole of modern probability reliability theory) have 
become so well established is the ease with which they can be used 
(by manual or computer methods.) 
All that is required is the formulation and solution of a set of 
differential equations with constant coefficients in the form: 
where.P1 represents the probability of the system being in state i 
at the time t and where ( C J is a state-transition coefficient 
matrix. The foliowing three examples will be used to illustrate 
the procedure: 
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Example 1 - Two state system (either it works or it doesn't) 
without repair - Figure 36a. 
provided P1(t=O) = 1 
A.12 = constant 
the familiar exponential reliability formula, in this case 
Example 2 - Two state system with failures and repair - Figure 36b 
In this case: 
dP1(t) 
- A12 J21 dt 
' 
[P.1 -
-
dP2(t) A12 
pl.: .~ 
dt -r21 
... 
and assuming ).12; ,.21 = constant 
P1(0) = 1 (the system is initially working) 
P2(o) =0 
Using the Lapl~ce transform to operate algebraically: 
s 'o/1 (5) - 1 = - ). '1'1 (5) + r"f2<s> 
5 2(5) = A ,.1 (5) - i y 2(5) 
5 r1Js) + s '¥.2(5) = 1 
~-
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... f 
"r1(S) 
t.~1 + s 
• • = s(s + '):12 + r21> 
"'\(2(S) 'A12 = s(s x12 + f21) + 
.and by transforming back 
1 ( r 21 + \2·-( )12 + r21)t] p1 ( t) = ~2 + f21 
P2(t) 
~2 ( 1- e-(A12 + f21)t1 
= ~12 + r21 
As previously discussed in Sectio·n 3, P1 is the system's 
instantaneous availability. The steady state availability is 
found for t ~ eo : 
P1 (eo) = AS state = t 21 MTBF = MTBF + MTTR 
Example 3: Three state system with repair (Figure 36c). 
This example is directly applicable to the discussion on Fail-Safe 
systems as discussed in Section 3. 
In the interest of clarity, .for this illustration it will be 
assumed that ~ 31 = r-21 = r 
In this case: · 
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dP 1 ( t)' 
r -< "12 + A 13 > dt r r. 
dP2(t) ,_ 
"12 -,. 0 - fl. dt 
dP3(t) ).13 
rj 
0 
-r dt 
P1 (t) + P2(t) + P3(t) = 1 
which gives 
p 1 ( t) = A12 +
1 
,.,3 +,.. r r + ( '\2 + ).13>·-( >-,2 + ).13 +r->t1 
P2(t) = 
A . 
12 { 1 - e-( ~ 12 + ).13 + f )tJ 
A.12 + :x13 + r 
P3(t) 
A13 [ 1 - e ~( A12 + ').,13 + P" )t 1 
= 
"12, + ).13 +fA 
One attractive feature of this mathematical model is that it permits 
the direct evaluation of the probability of a Dangerous Failure 
State, which can in turn be used to calculate the MTDF (Mean 
Time to Dangerous Failure). The procedure is this case consists in 
removing the return path from state 3 back to state 1. The 
probability P2(t) of being in this state at time t is therefore 
the probability of arriving there between 0 and t. 
It should be clear that this technique is applicable to systems 
with any degree of complexity, but beyond three states, it is 
desirable to resort to computer solutions. 
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I. 4. FORMULATION OF THE PROBABILITY OF ACCIDENT 
As described in Section 3.4, a number of factors can lead to 
. I 
accident. The following formulation can be used if the probabilities 
P1 , P2 and P3 are calculated as above: 
where PE is the probability of an event against which protection 
is not provided 
P is the conditional probability of an event leading to 
E1/1 
accident while the system operates correctly and against 
which some protection is provided. 
p is the conditional probability of an event leading to 
E2/2 
accident while the system has failed to safety and 
includes the performance of the standby system 
p . is the conditional probability of an event leading to 
E3/3 
accident while the system has failed to danger. 
These conditional probabilities can, in principle be calculated, 
but in practice they can be determined from data from past accident 
records, analysis by primary and secondary causes, etc., using 
well-established statistical techniques.· 
Appendix-Ill shows how PE1/ 1 has been calculated for the BR 
Automatic Warning System. 
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APPENDIX 11 
CALCULATIONS OF AVAILABILITY, RELIABILITY AND SAFETY FOR 
SIMPLE SYSTEM STRUCTURES 
The methods described in Section 3 and Appendix I are used here 
to derive expressions for the Availability, Reliability and 
Safety of the following system configurations. 
n/n replicated system with "unanimity" voting 
2/3 majority voting redundancy without partial fault 
notification 
2/3 majority votin9 redundancy with partial fault 
notification. 
The resultant expressions will be shown to lead to a method 
for deciding which configuration will yield the best 
compromise between perrformance and cost. 
DEfiNITIONS OF TERMS USED 
Each unit is assumed to have an output which can take two basic 
types of failure state (error and failure), which will be 
represented here as r5 (safe) and fD(dangerous). A fault 
is defined as any event which causes the unit to assume a failed 
state permanently, regardless of input instructions. 
"Degraded performance" is the state of the system in which not 
all the units are fault-free but a correct output from the 
system as a whole is assured. In a m/n majority voting system, 
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the maximum number of faults which will allow the state of 
degraded performance is (n-m). 
"Partial fault notification" is received when the comparison 
system is able to detect and announce a state of degraded 
performance. 
A "system error" occurs when sufficient units have developed 
faults for prediction of the accuracy of the system output to 
become impossible although the set of unit outputs would 
be acceptable to the comparator system. A "system failure" 
occurs when an unacceptable set of unit outputs reaches the 
comparator (e.g. different unit outputs in an n/n system). 
Note: In these calculations it ha~ been assumed that the 
comparator system is infallible. If this cannot be assumed,. 
correction may be made to the probabilities of arrival in 
each state my multiplying by the appropriate coefficients. 
This assumption is permissible, because the approach that has 
been taken at the British Railways R & D Division is such that 
the comparator and the units are indistinguishable. This is 
achieved by connecting all the logic units in a ring circuit, 
so that each unit checks others and is, in turn, checked out 
by other identical units. The only external components used 
in these circuits are several orders of magnitude more reliable 
than the logic units. This approach is now undergoing patent 
protection procedures and cannot be disclosed further at this 
stage. 
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PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS 
The choice of model for unit failure modes is affected by the 
proposed operational strategy. For thes8 calculations it has 
been assumed that all units will be checked after time T 
(T<M.T.B.F.), regardless of ~hether they have failed or not. 
(In this context "checked" means checked on site thoroughly 
enough for there to be no reason to doubt that the unit is in its 
original condition. It ~ill then be indistinguishable from a 
replacement unit. This approach can only be used with units 
having no wear-out mechanism and it shows one of the associated 
benefits 6f solid-state circuit technology). It has also been 
assumed that whenever a fault occurs in the system, all units 
are checked when the faulty unit is replaced. 
In the case of a 2/3 majority system a further question arises. 
"Is notification received if one of the three units becomes 
"faulty"?". Both answers to this question have been considered. 
From the first paragraph, it may be seen that the cycle ends 
either after time T or when a repair takes place. 
When no comparison with a correct unit is possible, a fault 
in a single unit should be treated as an error unless there 
is information redundancy. Repair conditions are considered 
in terms of the status of the whole system rather than that 
of single units. 
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The basic unit model has a probability of developing a fault 
by time T given by: 
P(F',T) = R (T) 
u 
where R (T), the unit reliability, is assumed to be: 
u 
constant failure rate for safe 
failure state. 
constant failure rate for 
·dangerous failure state 
The probabilities of safe and dangerous faults by time T are 
given by: 
P(S,T) ).15 ( 1 - R (T)) = A1s + A.1o u 
P(D,T) A1D (1 - R (T)) = 
'A1s + ">t1o u 
This gives a basic statistical building block that will be used 
to analyse the following systems: 
n/n replicated system with comparison of outputs 
2/3 majority voting system without partial fault notification 
2/3 majority voting system with partial fault notification 
11.1. CALCULATIONS F'OR N/N 
The system model is shown in figure 30. 
The reliability of an n/n system is the probability that no 
units break down in timeT. 
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For a system with a finite cycle duration Availability is defined: 
( 1) 
where F x is a particular type of fault and j xl is the repair 
probability when that fault occurs, provided P(F ,T) is small. 
X 
This definition is well established in reliability theory 
(see Reference 10 ). 
For all fault conditions, except simultaneous similar faults in all 
units, the system will arrive in state 3 (system failure). 
• 
• • 
P (2,T) 
9 
Where Ps(2,T.) is given by: 
P (2,T) 
s 
( 1 - (R ( T >1 n ) • r A 1 5 
u L l15 + . -x1D 
"15 +------~15 + ~10 
(2) 
• 
• • 
(1 - R (nT)){1 - R (t))n-1 
u u 
(3) 
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Where 't' is the time for the comparator system to operate. '( may 
however be altered to show the effect of the relative frequency 
of simultal')eous faults. For example, if T = .0, this implies 
that simultaneous faults are impossible and the last equation 
becomes: P {2,T) = o, as might be expected. 
s 
On the other hand, the situation where only simultaneous faults 
can occur is modelled by setting ?: = m • This gives 
{4) 
which is the correct expression for this situation. All intermediate 
probabilities of simultaneous faults can, therefore, be established 
by defining a positive value for ~. 
The safety of the system may be defined as: 
S (T) = 1 - P (2,T) 
s s 
• 
• • S (T) s ( 1 - R ( n T)) ( 1 - R ( t )) n-1 u u 
Rewritinq (2) gives: 
P (3,T) = 1 - R (T) - (1 - S (T)) 
s s s 
• 
• • P (3,T) = S (T) - R (T) s s s 
(5) 
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• 
We can now write an expression for availability: 
A (T) = 
s 
• 
• • 
• 
• • 
P (3,T) 1 - ...;;.s __ _ 
r3, T 
P (2,T) 
s 
where ~ 21 and ~31 are defined as in Appendix I. 
If R (T) = 1, S (T) = 1, then 
s s 
A (T) = 1, which is obviously true. 
s 
R (T) = S (T) = 0 cannot be tried, as 
s s 
a) 
b) 
T ( MTBF 
P(F ,T) « 1 
X 
II.2. CALCULATIONS FOR 2/3 SYSTEM WITH NO NOTIFICATION OF FIRST FAULT 
From the definitions of failure and error states, it may be seen 
that the first fault which occurs will put the system into a state 
of degraded performance. The second fault will cause a system error 
and the third fault will leave it in this state. The system model 
is shown in Figure 31 • 
jt1 , 1 only exists if only one fault occurs by T and it is then 
infinite. Since it does not matter what type of fault occurs, 
the binomial expansion may be used 
(6) 
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(7) 
(The terms from left to right being associated with o, 1, 2, 3 
faults respectively). 
In order to make this calculation compatible with that for the n/n 
system, the concept of ~will be reintroduced, even though it 
will usually be possible to assume T = 0. This modification 
may be achieved by assuming that any fault but the first can occur 
in time (T + ~). The first 3 terms may be modified easily 
(bearing in mind that if a fault occurs the reliability must then 
also be maintained for time (T + 1: )) and they become: 
- [ Ru(T) ) 3 + 3 [Ru(T+ !) ). 2 {1 - Ru(T)]. + 3Ru(J:+ 1:) ( 1-Ru(T)J r 1-Ru(T+ -z:)J 
(B) 
Since the full expansion must continue to add up to unity, the 
fourth term can be shown to become: 
(9) 
Now P(2,T) is the sum of the third and fourth terms. 
The safety of the system S (T) = 1 - P(2, T) 
s 
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• 
• • 
( 11) 
Under these fault definitions there are two forms of reliability 
and these are defined here: 
a) Rs1(T) =Probability of no fault occurring at all in T 
b) Rs1 ,(T)= Probability of system still being operational at timeT. 
In this system: R 1 , = S (T) s s 
This does not mean that the definition is trivial. 
In more complicated systems this direct relationship no longer 
holds.· 
The equation for Rs1(T) is as follows: 
R 1(T) = R (3T) s u (12) 
We may define Availability from above: 
A (T) = 1 - P(2,T) 
s f"21 T 
where P(2,T) may be obtained from the equation given above in (10). 
• 
• • A (T) = 1 -s 
The boundary conditions of r = D,•;R (T) = D, 1 may be seen to be 
u 
correct. An interesting point is that when 't: = oo, P( 1 ', T) = 0 
( 13) 
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because the system passes straight from state 1 to state 2. 
II.3. CALCULATIONS FOR 2/3 SYSTEM WITH NOTIFICATION OF FIRST FAULT 
The first question is: "What action is taken when notification of 
the fault is received"? 
Three of the possible answers are as follows: 
(i) Take no action apart from replacing the faulty units as soon 
as possible. 
(ii) Allow the system to reformulate the remaining two non-
faulty units into a 2/2 system. 
(iii) Adopt the second course and replace the faulty unit as soon 
as possible, resetting the system to 2/3 when this has 
been achieved. 
Each of these answers is dealt with in a subsequent section. 
II.3.1. Answer (i) 
The model for this system is the same as the previous one 
shown in Figure 31. 
To obtain stam1' one fault in timeT is required. 
To obtain state 2 at least one fault in time T and at least 
one fault in time before repair 
1 are required. 
~1 , 1 will be referred to in this type of system as JL31 
since it is the probability of repair from a state in which 
a fault has bien detected. 
State 2 can be reached by at least one fault in time T and 
at least one fault in time (_1_ + "z; ) • 
j31 
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The assumption implicit in this statement is that the repair 
time is a constant <li--> and not a probability function. 
1 31 
• 
• • 
R 1(T) = 1 - R (3T) s u 
S (T) 
s 
A (T) = 1 
s 
R l 2 (_1_ + -z: )jtJ 
u l r31 
The last three equations follow directly from definitions 
and it will be noticed that they are of the same form as 
equations already derived. The difference lies in the value 
of S (T)·. 
s 
If _1_ = T and T<< ~ the value for S9 (T) becomes the f' 31 1\. 
same for both cases. This may be seen to be correct. 
{By definition ~ ~ T). 
1 31 
11.3.2. Answer (ii) 
The model for this situation is shown in Figure 32. 
( 15) 
(16) 
(17) 
(18) 
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In this case ~1 , 1 F ~ 31 since no repair procedure is 
initiated by arrival in state 1 1 • 
It is apparent that: 
= R (nT) 
··u 
(19) 
The ways in which the system can arrive in states 2 and 3 
will be considered next. Clearly state 2 can be achieved 
by three simultaneous similar faults. It can also be 
achieved by one fault followed by two simultaneous faults 
which are similar to each other. It is not quite so clear 
that state 2 can be achieved just by two simultaneous 
similar faults. This can be shown by the following 
argument: 
In order to reformulate into a 2/2 configuration, the 
system must be able to decide which uriit has a fa~lt. If 
two similar simultaneous faults occur, it will decide wrongly 
and use the two faulty units for its 2/2 logic. This is 
clearly a system error. 
It can be concluded that any two or more simult3neous 
simila~ faults will cause a system error. 
• 
• • 
P(2,T) = P (two s.s. faults, T) + P(three s.s. faults, T) 
where s.s. = simultaneous similar. 
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Now: 
which is, of course, P(2,T) for a 3/3 system. 
If '7: is small, then: 
P(3 s.s. faults, T) '« P(2 s.s. faults, T) 
and R (1:) = 1 
u 
• 
• • 
• 
.. . 
Turning to the Modified Binomial shown in Section 2.2., it may 
be seen that: 
R81 1 (T)= [First and Second Terms of M.B.l 
and P(3,T) = [Third and Fourth Terms of M.s.) - P(2,T) 
• 
• • 
(20) 
(22) 
(23) 
(24) 
I 
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And thus: 
.. 
• • P(3,T) 
The expression for Availability is: 
A (T) = 1 - P(3,T) 
s J"31 T 
S (T) - R 1 1 (T) 
.;: 1 - s s 
]J-31 T 
[ 1 - R · (T)} 
• A (T) 1 - s1 ' • • = s f31 T 
1 
- 5 (T) s 
r21 T 
(1 - ss<r>] ( 1 r?.1 T 
. ~ow it can be seen that all .equations for Availability 
(25) 
,:1 T) 
look very similar. Remarks on this fact will be found in Section 3, 
11.3.3. Answer (iii) 
The model for this system is the same as that shown in 
Figure 32. 
For this system: 
Rs1(T) = R (3T) u (27) 
State 3 may be reached by: 
a) two single faults, one in TimeT, the second in _j__ r31 
(26) 
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b) two simultaneous dissimilar faults. 
• 
• • l1 - R (_L) ] R (1:) + u. f31 u 
.. 
• • P(3,T) = f 1 - R { 3T) ] l R ( 3 t) l1 - R ( r2 ) l u u u 31 
+ 
6 ).15 • )..10 
() 15 + ~10 ) 2 
+ 
State 2 may be reached as in the previous system except that if a 
single fault occurs, the simultaneous similar faults have to occur 
within time J2- (i.e. "before the system is repaired", instead 
r31 
of "before the end of period T", which was the case in the 
previous system) Referring again to the graph, the assumption is 
made that a single fault will occur, on average, after time T/2. 
Therefore, simultaneous similar faults occurring in time 
T 1 (- - ----) when a single fault has already occurred do not 
2 f31 
cause a system error. 
From the equation giving P(2,T): 
(28) 
2 2 ~ 15 + '). 10 
( i\15 + ,. 10) 2 
(29) 
• 
• • P(2,T) 
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2 2 3( '). 15 + ). 10) 
= 2 
( A1S + ).10) 
[ 1 - [ 1 - R ( li - _L )1·1 
u 
2 
. /'"31 u 
2 '\ 2 
• 
• • P(2,T) 
3( ). 1 + ,... 1 ) 
= 2 
( ).1 + }v1 ) 
[ 1 - R ( 3T)) [ 1 - R ( ~)] R ( .21 - - 3-) 
u u u 2 /31 
The following constraints apply when using the above equation (30): 
a) ~ << T 
b) - 1 -<< T 
}A- 31 
c) T(( MTBF 
The remaining expressions may be written direct from definitions: 
S (T) = 1 - P(2,T) 
s 
A (T) = 1 -
s 
Rs1 ,(T) = 1- P(2,T)- P(3,T) 
II.4. THE GENERALITY OF THE AVAILABILITY EQUATION 
The fullest version of the Availability Equ~tion used here is (32) 
A (T) = 1 -
s 
1 - Rs1 ,(T) 
t31T 
(31) 
(32) 
(33) 
(30) 
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All other Availability Equations used are simplified versions 
of this 
Equation Simplification Reason 
(6) R (T = Rsl'(T) No state 1 ' s 
(13) Rs1'(T) = S (T) No state 3 s 
(18) 
" 
11 
(26) No simplification 
possible 
(32) 
" 
Note· that the term ( ~1 T 
21 
~1 r> is unlikely to vanish because 
31 
the time _j__ includes time for detection of an error. An error r 21 
is an"undectectabl~fault and so it i~ almost certain that: 
1 
Therefore the term cannot be assumed to vanish. 
It.S. POSSIBLE OPTIMIZATION TECHNIQUE 
All the equations given above are in terms of six variables: 
t-.13' ?:' 
' r 31' T. 
These can be divided into two sets of three. 
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The first three, ).12, k13 , and t, may be called the "design 
variables" and the second three, r 21 , r-31 , T, the "strategic 
variables". 
Supposing the basic problem is as follows: 
"Given 1 or more circuits, to find the best system configuration 
and strategy in use for each and thus determine which is the best". 
Now if the strategic variables are set up on mutually orthogonal 
axes, each point in this space will have associated with it: 
a) a cost for the strategy 
b) for each circuit design and system configuration 
values of A (T), R (T) and 5 (T) which will have 
s s s 
associated costs. 
In addition the cost of the design will be represented as a 
constant potential in this space. 
Therefore, for each circuit design and system configuration, 
there is a cost potential in the strategic space. It is possible 
therefore, to pick the minimum cost point which has satisfactory 
values of A (T), R (T) and 5 (T) for each design and configuration 
s s s 
and thus pick the best. 
N.B. If the cost association figures for A (T), R (T) arid 5 (T) s s s 
are realistic, then the values will automatically be satis-
factory. 
\ 
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Simplifications will probably be available. For example, it 
may be felt that ~21 and r 31 are virtually fixed in which case 
the graphs merely become cost v~ time between replacements. 
Since values of ~ 21 and ~ 31 will not be constant throughout 
the country, it may prove that one design or configuration is 
better in one place than another. Such facts must be borne in 
mind when using this process. · 
II.6. CONCLUSIONS 
It is not possible to make any sweeping conclusions from these 
equations without putting numbers in. Some limited conclusions 
may be drawn, however. 
(i) It is apparent that the Availability of the system is 
considerably enhanced by the existence of state 1', the 
state of degraded performance. 
(ii) Availability, Reliability and Safety are increased if scime 
useful action is initiated by the arrival in state 1'. 
(iii) Safety is considerably increased if this action is to 
reformulate the remaining units into a 2/2 system, thus 
opening the path to state 3 (inaccessible to a 2/3 system). 
This arrangement could be referred to as a 2/2 system with 
an on-line spare which is used first. 
(iv) When the above arrangement is adopted, the advantage 
obtained by initiating a repair procedure in addition to 
reformulating the system is strictly second order. Whether 
the advantage repays the extra stress on maintenance could 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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be deduced from the optimisation technique in Section 4 for 
particular designs. 
(v) For systems in which simultaneous si~ilar faults cause 
system errors, the probability of a system error will be 
minimized for constant ( '-1 5 + }.10 ) when ~1 5 = A1 0 
This means that "preferred" fault-types should be avoided 
if both high and low faults are legitimate outputs, i.e. 
electronic circuits are preferrable to, say, "fail-safe" 
relays. 
·~ 1: 
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APPENDIX Ill 
EXAMPLE OF EVALUATION PROCEDURE OF A SAFETY SYSTEM 
PERFORMANCE OF THE BRITISH RAILWAYS AUTOMATIC WARNING SYSTEM 
The partial study presented in this Appenaix is part of a wider 
study currently in progress at the R & D division at Derby, 
related to costs and benefits of Train Control Systems. 
The information used in the material presented here is based 
on published data available to the general public in the form 
of Annual and Accident reports. 
While it is appreciated that the information available is 
neither complete, nor sufficient to achieve statistical 
rigour, it is the author's opinion that the resulting margin 
of error is acceptable, and that it suitably illustrates the 
procedure. 
The study is concerned with determining the accident rate 
attributable to, or otherwise not prevented by, the British 
Railways Automatic Warning System (BRAWS), but only a part of 
the study is given here as an example. 
III.1. OPERATION OF BRAWS 
System description 
Trackside equipment: Permanent magnet 
Electromagnet (energised only when the 
signal to which the equipment is associated 
is showing clear). 
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The permanent magnet is the first one to be found in the normal 
direction of travel and is placed, on average, 200 m before the 
signal. 
Train borne equipment: · r~agnetic receiver 
Logic to determine whether signal is showing 
clear. 
If the signal is showing clear the trainborne equipment is 
automatically reset and a bell rings in the cab. 
If the signal is showing other than clear, a horn is sounded and 
an acknowledgement by the driver is necessary to cancel an 
otherwise automatic brake application. A special (sunflower) 
display will be activated after the acknowledgement to be reset by 
the next permanent magnet. 
BRAWS came into being during the modernisation of motive power and 
was originally designed to operate on steam locomotives and 
semaphore signals ( and AWS indications were given at all distant 
signals) and its installation only began in earnest following tha 
accident at Harrow on 8th October 1952 (High speed double collision). 
Since then, there has been little change in BRAWS design to make 
it compatible with multi aspect colour light signalling or to update 
its technology (it is in fact an overlay system designed for 
semaphore signalling). 
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III.2. INFORMATION IN BRAWS 
It needs to be recognised that (see British Railways General 
Appendix, Rules and Regulations) there is a distinction between 
what a driver thinks things mean and what he is told they mean. 
Thus, if the driver is to get useful information (as against 
correct but useless information), additional information is 
required, e.g. is he in BRAWS territory, what happened when he 
opened up the cab, etc. 
Strictly speaking BRAWS can give the following information: 
a. At the instant of passing over the magnet assembly, the signal 
is showing clear (except in situations such as outlined below -
blank display and bell). 
b. If the display is blank but there is no bell, the display 
indicates: That the previous signal was showing clear {section 
between magnets), or that the train is running over non-
equipped territory (see also the second example below). 
c. If the display is showing a sunflower: An acknowledgement 
has been made after passing a magnet. The display represents 
one condition out of the following: 
At the instant of passing over the last magnet: 
The signal was showing double yellow, or 
" " 
" " 
" " 
" " 
" " 
" " 
yellow, or 
red, or 
red and subsidiary, or 
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the electromagnet circuit had failed, or 
the magnet is associated with a Speed Restriction Warning 
(Morpeth magnet), 
or train is running over non-equipped territory. 
EXAMPLES OF MISLEADING INDICATIONS 
a. Running through a non-equipped zone 
DERBY STATION 
train display will be blank ("clear") 
despite having passed a YY aspect. 
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b. Premature cancellation of Speed Restriction ldarninq 
magnet reminder. 
BUR TON Aws er, 
'¥ ~' 1- AA. I""' !J~ ._------~--------~--------------~.--------------~~~------~-----3r_~;~ yds ,......_ __ .;.-.__~ 
1 250 yds in "f'pecial 
PSR 
. 200 yds 
... 
npprox. 6 seconqs at 90 mph 
;. 
. 
. 
I 
I 
~I 
50 yds 
BRAWS warning for PSR (Morpeth magnet) 
3 - 4 seconds Acknowledgement 
and reminder 
20il yds 
I 
. 
cases'' 
Display cleared by electromagnet 
no reminder of PSR warning 
1-- -- - -- - - -- - - -1 
6 seconds. 
but neither of these cases is a fault state. 
III.3. PERFORMANCE OF BRAWS 
Despite considerable technical innovation in the field of railway 
signalling {colour light signals, BR. 930 relays, geographic 
circuits, remote control, etc.) BRAUS has remained largely 
unchanged. 
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In re-examining the concepts and objectives of track to train 
communication systems, it became essential to determine the 
performance of BRAWS particularly with: 
Four aspect colour light signals 
Complex operating practice (speed restriction warnings, 2-way 
working, complex track layouts, coupling and splitting of 
trains at stations, etc.) 
High traffic densities (fast dynamics in changing signal 
aspects while the train is still in section). 
III. 4. ANALYSIS PROCEDURE 
Appendix I presents the mathematical basis necessary for the 
analysis of safety systems. The techniques in this Thesis fall 
into two categories: 
Reliability analysis techniques, designed for the purpose of 
identifying the failure rates applicable to different failure 
modes. It should be clear that these techniques are 
considerably more detailed, and therefore more involved than 
the simple calculation of MTBF, based on adding the failure 
rates of all components. 
Calculation of the conditional probability functions which 
define the probability of accident PA' which determine how 
well the system under consideration interfaces with its 
operating environment. 
The main p8 rt of the study carried out for British Railways and 
presented in this Appendix, dealt with the evaluation of the 
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conditional probability of an event leading to an accident even 
when the system is working correctly. P111 , and more specifically 
the study concerned itself with the comparison of the value of 
this probability under ''with" and "without" BRAWS conditions. 
This example indicates that this evaluation is best carried out 
by the examination of records and, in the study of new systems, 
where considerable departure from established practice in the 
interface between man and machine, considerable caution in the 
choice of coefficients will need to be excercised. 
In the interest of clarity, however, a brief example of the 
reliability analysis techniques, as applied to BRAWS will be 
given, although not in detailed numerical form. 
figure 28, of Appendix I, has been modified in figure 34 to 
illustrate how this method of analysis can be applied in practice 
and it shows that, depending on the nature of the system, the 
subdivision into subsystem, component, etc., may·need different 
numbers of steps. 
The division shown takes as its obvious starting point the full 
system and its interaction, and defines two (m = 2) subsystems, 
t~ackside and trainborne. These are in turn subdivided into 
components f , namely f 1 and f. 5 for the trackside subsystem 
and f 6 to f 12 for the trainborne sybsystem and some of these 
components can in turn be subdivided again, should it be 
necessary. 
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Thus, considering the system level, the n observable system 
states are defined as follows: 
Q. Correct operating states: 
J 
01 Signal aspect: Green 
Cab indication: 1 sec. Bell, at a point between 200 yds 
in front of the signal and the signal itself. 
o2 Signal aspect: Oouble yellow, Single yellow, or Red. 
Cab indication: Horn followed by a brake application if 
not cancelled within 4 seconds at a point between 200 
yds in front of the signal and the signal itself. 
Following cancellation the indicator will show Yellow 
and Black in a sunflower pattern. 
F. Failure states: 
J 
F1 Signal aspect: Green 
Cab indication: Horn and Bell simultaneously. 
F2 . Signal aspect: Green . 
Cab indication: Horn instead of Bell 
F3 Signal aspect: Green 
Cab indication: None. 
F4 Signal aspect: Double Yellow, Single Yellow or Red 
Cab indication: Bell and Horn simultaneously. 
Fs Signal aspect: Double Yellow, Single Yellow or Red 
Cab indication: Bell instead of Horn. 
F6 : Signal aspect: Double Yellow, Single Yellow or Red 
Cab indication: Brake applied without Horn warning. 
F7 Signal aspect: Double Yellow, Single Yellow or Red 
Cab indication: None. 
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FB Not at signal 
Cab indication: Horn. 
Fg . Not at signal . 
Cab indication: Bell. 
F10 : Horn and brake not cancellable 
~1 Indicator "stuck" in warning state. 
All these observable Failure states can be classified into Safe 
and Dangerous, the context being that of an Automatic Warning 
System: 
Safe Failure States: F1 , F2, F3, F4 , F6 , F8 , F9 , F10 , F11 • 
Dangerous Failure States: F5, F7• 
The next stage in the analysis could be the study of the two 
major subsystems, namely, the trainborne and the trackside 
equipments. 
The detailed description of BRAWS, including circuit diagrams, 
etc., can be found in Booklet No. 24~ issued by the Institution 
of Railway Signal Engineers, and need not be repeated here 
(Ref~ 19 ). It is sufficient, therefore, to complement the 
brief description given earlier in this Appendix by postulating 
that each of the subsystems can be further split into a number 
of components (which could, if desired, be further subdivided 
into their elements, etc.). 
Concerning the two subsystems, their observable states can be 
described as follows: 
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Trackside eguipment observable states xi1-
Permanent magnet present and of adequate strength x11 
Permanent magnet absent or of inadequate strength x21 
Electromagnet correctly energised (signal aspect Green) x31 
Electromagnet permanently energised x41 
Electromagnet permanently de-energised x51 
These five states can again be identified with correct safe 
and dangerous system observable states: 
1 
EQ: x11' x31 
E1 • X F safe· 51 
[ 1 • X X F dangerous· 21' 41 
Trainborne eguipment observable states xi2-
1 second Bell at a point between 200 yds in front of 
the signal and the signal itself 
Horn followed by Brake application if not cancelled 
within 4 seconds, at a point between 200 yds in front 
of the signal and the signal itself 
Horn and Bell simultaneously 
Horn instead of Bell 
Bell instead of Horn 
No indication 
Brake applied without Horn warning 
Horn not at signal 
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Bell not at signal 
Horn and Brake not cancellable 
Indicator permanently on "warning" 
and, as before, these 11 states can be identified with correct, 
safe and dangerous system observable states: 
[2 
Q x12' x22 
[2 . 
x32' x42' x72' x82' x92' x10,2' x11 , 2 • F safe" 
E2 . x52' x62 F dangerous . 
At this stage it becomes possible to identify the particular 
role of each subsystem and component. For example, it can now 
be shown that all the fault states: r1 , F4, F6, F8, F9 , F10 
and F
11 
can only be attributed to failures in the trainborne 
equipment. 
The next stage in the analysis concerns itself with the analysis 
of the individual components. It can be noted from Figure 34 
that several of these components are of a sufficiently simple 
nature to permit the analysis of their contribution to system 
performance without further subdivision. 
Taking, for example, the components of the trackside subsystem: 
f
1
, Permanent magnet: 
E. 11 : Permanent magnet of adequate strength 
E. • Permanent magnet of inadequate strength 12" 
f 13: Permanent magnet missing or damaged. 
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€ 
11 
is the correct state, a'nd an analysis of performance (or 
a guess when the system is new) will give a probability of this 
being the case. In BRAWS this probability is estimated as 
1 - 5.10-4 (from failure reports dated 1970- 73). 
E has now been virtually eliminated by design, as High 12 
Strenght Ferrites with a Square Histeresis Loop are used. 
The probability of a damaged magnet, despite its protective 
steel ramp and case is thus in the order of s.1o-4• 
E2, Electromagnet: 
t 21: Electromagnet energised to adequate strength 
2.22: El act roma gn et energised to insufficient strength 
t23: Electromagnet permanently energised 
£24: Electromagnet not energised. 
e21 is the correct operating state. 
~22 and f 24 are safe failure states, but f constitutes 22 
a failure in the power supply circuit (see f. s> and t 24 can 
occur due to either of four. conditions: 
a. Open circuit electromagnet coil. 
b. Cable failure between the signal and the electromagnet 
(see [ 3). 
c. Circuit not completed by the signal relay (see € 4). 
d. No power supply (see £ 5) 
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Thus, f, 22 is quantified under f. 5, and £.24 in this list will 
be associated only with the failure rate of the electromagnet 
coil. 
t, 
23 is the dangerous failure state and can occur only as a 
result of a failure in the signal relay (see e 4) • 
£ 
3' Cable to Electro~agnet. 
£ 31: Cable correct 
£ 32: Cable open circuited 
e 33= Cable missing {vandalism, etc.). 
These two latter conditions represent the situation described 
under e24-b' and are safe failure states. 
i 4, Signalling relay. 
f . 41. All contacts and coil operate normally 
£ 42 : Open circuit coil 
t 43 : Short circuit coil 
t 44 : Welded contacts. 
~42 prevents the relay from being energised and thus leads to 
the condition described as f- 24-c. 
~43 is virtually eliminated by design and, in the worst case, 
could result in some turns being shortcircuited and thus reduced 
coil inductance and longer operating time. 
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£44 is also virtually eliminated by the design of carbon-silver 
contacts. This is potentially a dangerous failure, but long 
years of experience with this relay design indicate that the 
probability of such a failure is within acceptable values (no 
such incident has been recorded to date). 
fs, Power Supply. 
€ • Normal output 51 ° 
£52: Reduced output 
€53: No output, 
where £52 and £53 are safe failure conditions associated with 
f-22 and [24• 
The study of the power supply could be taken further by examining 
the effect of each basic component, e.g. battery, trickle charger, 
fuse, etc. 
Examining now the trackside equipment observable states, these 
can be associated with their component states as follows: 
Permanent magnet present and of adequate strength x,, --+- f 11 
Permanent magnet of inadequate strength (*) x21 --+- f.12 
Permanent magnet absent (*) x21 --f- t 13 
Electromagnet correctly energised x21 -+- E21' 
e.41' 
(* dangerous states) 
£_31' 
E. 51 
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Electromagnet permanently energised (*) x41 ~ ~ 44 
Electromagnet permanently de-energised x51 --+ 
" 
f. 24a, 22' 
E ·;;.. .. .--32' ~3, e 42' 
c i: 53' 52' 
thus illustrating .the mapping of component observable states into 
observable subsystem states. 
The analysis of the trainborne equipment can be carried out 
exactly along the same lines. Its somewhat more complex nature 
makes it necessary to subdivide it into a number of component 
parts. 
The diagram in figure 35 shows, with the exception of the power 
supply, the circuit diagram of the trainborne BRAWS equipment, 
as used on BR locomotives and multiple units. 
For the purpose of the analysis, the following will be considered 
as components: 
The receiver 
The reset coil 
The EP valve 
The indicator 
The reset button 
The reminder of the logic unit 
The power supply. 
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t 6 , Magnetic receiver. 
Three conditions can be identified with the magnetic receiver: 
t . 
61" Correct operation, the receiver can respond normally 
and will provide electric contacts at both N and 5 
positions. 
t . 
62" 
Receiver will not commutate from its rest position 
("stuck at N"). 
f
63
: Receiver cannot be returned to position N {"stuck 
at 5"). 
l 
62 
can be shown to be a dangerous condition as it effectively 
. prevents the detection of a permanent magnet. 
£
63 
is a safe state in which the brakes cannot be released 
(as far as this analysis is concerned, this fault is local to 
the receiver- logic faults are discussed ~n ~ ). 11 
f Reset coil. 7' 
The reset coil is placed near the receiver and is driven by the 
logic in such a way that the automatic brake application 
initiated by the equipment may be cancelled by the driver in 
charge of the train. 
is the normal operating state of this coil. 
represents an open circuit reset coil. It will be accepted 
that due to its constructural features, a short ciruited coil 
cannot occur under any forseeable operating conditions. 
- 128-
The inability to reset the receiver would also result in a safe 
state in which the brakes cannot be released. 
~B' Electropneumatic valve (EP valve) 
The electropneumatic valve is an integral part of the braking 
system, and this study will only be concerned with electrical 
failures. 
represents the correct operation of the EP valve 
represents an open circuited EP valve coil 
t83 represents a shortcircuited (welded) EP valve contact 
~82 is a safe state in which the brakes cannot be released. 
L83 is a dangerous state in which the brakes cannot be applied 
(The probability of this event is reduced by both valve design 
and the use of redundancy (twin and triple valves)). 
t The indicator. 9' 
In addition to its function as a visual reminder, the indicator 
performs a logical function in the reset coil circuit (contacts 
4 and 5 in the bottom part of figure 35), and the reset coil 
will only be energised if the indicator has moved to the "sun-
flower" position and closed the contact. 
t 
91 
t. 92 
t93 
contact correct 
infinite resistance contact 
welded contact. 
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~92 results in a safe state in which the brakes cannot be released. 
~93 does not by itself lead to a fault condition (other than 
a "stuck at sunflower" indicator. 
t10 , The reset button. 
The possible conditions are: 
Correct operation 
Infinite resistance contacts 
t 
10,3a Welded contacts in position 2 
~10,3b in position 3. 
~ 10 , 2 and t 10 , 3a/b will both result in the inability to energise 
the relay coil, and hence in a situation where the brakes cannot 
be released. 
C11 , The logic unit. 
The logic functions of BRAWS are carried out by a simple circuit 
of four relays, labelled in the circuit diagram in Figure 35 
as BR, SR, EPR and NCR. 
The proper operation of the (sequential) circuit also relies 
on certain time delays, being achieved by the use of capacitors. 
The bHsic operation of the logic can be summarised as follows: 
When the receiver passes over a permanent magnet, the S contact 
is made. This energises the SR relay, which latches {contact SR3). 
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The indicator's "8" coil is energised, resetting it to the 
blank position. 
The circuit is arranged in such a way that the EPR relay 
will remain energised for 1 second after opening the contact 
SR1·• 
Two basic situations are now possible: 
a. Energised electromagnet present. 
In this case the EPR relay does not drop out and the returning 
of the receiver to the N contact causes the BR relay to be 
energised (sounding the Bell for 1,5 sec.). The SR relay drops 
and the system returns to its original state when the BR relay 
is de-energised (through contact SR1 ). 
b. No electromagnet. 
After a 1 second delay, the EPR relay becomes de-energised (thus 
releasing the EPR1 latch cont~ct). EPR 2 opens the EP valve and 
EPR3 closes to permit the completion of the NCR circuit. 
If and when the reset button is operated, the NCR relay becomes 
energised and the receiver's reset coil returns the receiver 
to the N.contact. 
Contact NCR
1 
provides an alternative path for energising the 
EPR rela~. NCR2 drops the SR relay and this, together with 
contact NCR 3 energises the "y"coil of the indicator. Contact 
NCR
4 
latches the NCR relay, and the trainborne unit will remain 
in this state until a new permanent magnet is encountered, in 
which case the cycle begins again. 
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Failure analysis 
The logic unit represents a good example, of a subsystem for whi:h 
further subdivision into simpler elements, e.g. the relays, does 
not provide the desired answers, due to the interdependence 
between these elements. 
In situations such as these, systematic analysis, point by point, 
appears to be the best answer. Logic circuits lend themselves 
to computer simulation and, in fact these techniques have been 
used in 1968/69 by the British Railways R & 0 Division, working 
in conjunction with the National Computing Centre (NCC) of 
~anchester. 
In the case of the logic unit, this analysis would be carried 
out by considering each relay in tu~n and considering the cases 
of open circuit coil and welded contacts. The type of relay 
used in the logic unit does not exclude the possibility of 
a welded contact while the other contacts (excluding the back 
contact) are operating correctly. 
Because such an analysis would be neither original nor 
particularly useful in illustrating the procedure, it will not 
be included in this analysis. 
12 Power supply. 
Although the power supply can also be subdivided into various 
elementary parts, for the purpose of this simple analysis, it 
will be treated as a sinqle unit. 
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The circuit has been arranged in such a manner that 
12,1 
.12~2 
Normal power supply: System mperates correctly 
Power supply failure (zero output voltage) 
results in the operation of the EP valve, and thus, a brake 
application. 
As already shown in the case of the trackside equipment, all 
these failure states could now be mapped onto the subsystem 
failure states, and these in turn with the system observable 
states. 
This will lead to failure equations listing all the events 
which can cause a particular failure state, and if the nature 
of the statistical distribution of these failures is known, 
a numerical description of the probability of transition to 
any particular state can be obtained. 
These probabilities can then be used in the Markov process models 
of the system described in Appendix I, in order to calculate 
the probabilities P1 , P2 and P3• 
The second part of this analysis will be concerned with the 
determination of one of the conditional probabilities (P1 ;1 ~ 
in the equation leading to the probability of accident PA. 
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For the second part of the analysis it was considered that 
the most suitable method of evaluation would be to correlate 
accident records,·since BRAWS is intended as an aid to safety 
with train miles under different sets of conditions. The 
analysis procedure involved the following two areas: 
Accident Identification 
For the purpose of this study the following steps were 
followed: 
a. Listing of all accidents resulting from Signals Passed 
at Danger (SPD) which were reported between 1.1.1969 and 
31.7.1974 (a total of 120). 
These dates were chosen on the following grounds: 
The period under examination was long enough to even 
out statistical fluctuations. 
Signalling and traffic conditions have been 
sufficiently stable to permit comparison. 
b. From the above listing, the following were deleted: 
Those where the primary cause was other than human error. 
Those that occurred in non-colour light signal territory. 
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c. The remainder were classified into: 
B. 
27. 
BRAWS fitted territory and fitted trains. 
BRAWS fitted trains over unfitted portions within 
BRAWS fitted territory (e.g. complex parts at Derby, 
Birmingham, Glasgow Central, etc.). 
Territory not fitted with BRAWS (Mainly the Southern 
Region). 
These accidents are listed in Tables 1, 2 and 3 respectively. 
4.69 
5.70 
TABLE 1. 
MAJOR ACCIDENTS IN COLOUR LIGHT MULTIPLE ASPECT 
SIGNALS AND BRAWS TERRITORY 1969 - 1974. PRIMARY 
CAUSE: HUMAN ERROR LEADING TO SPD 
Monmore Green L.M. Collision 
Olbury L .M. Collision 
16.12.71 Lenten Junction L.M. Collision 
27. 4.73 Kidsgrove L.M. Collision AWS isolated 
by driver 
29. 6.73 Euston L.M. Signalman able to avoid accident 
by diverting to empty platform 
18. 5.73 Reading Station w.R. Collision (W.R. Ramp) 
21.10.73 Bethnal Green E.R. Collision and Derailment 
19.10. 70 
30. B.73 
11 • 6.74 
21. 5.69 
25.12.69 
17. 7.70 
17. 7.70 
5.10.70 
19.10. 70 
9. 7.71 
29. 3. 71 
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TABLE 1. (continued) 
Glasgow Central Sc.R. Collision after pas sir<: 
two signals at danger 
Shields Junction sc.R. Collisision into train 
stopped to extinguish fire 
r'luirhouse Junction Sc.R. Collision between 2 E~1Us 
TABCE 2. 
MAJOR ACCIDENTS IN COLOUR LIGHT MULTIPLE ASPECT 
SIGNALS. UNFITTED AREAS IN BRAWS TERRITORY 
1969 - 74. PRIMARY CAUSE: HUMAN ERROR LEADING 
TO SPO. 
Manchester Piccadilly Collision 
Manchester Piccadilly Run through points 
Crewe South Junction Run through points 
Birmingham New Street Run through points 
Manchester Piccadilly Collision 
'• 
Glasgow Central Collision 
Birmingham New Street Derailment 
Study not completed 
Glasgow area reports 12 SPD in 1969) 
Glasgow Central 
in unfitted zone* 
1 6 SPD in 1970) 
Collision 
* Further information on these incidents is not available and these 
will, therefore, not be introduced into the calculations. 
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TABLE 3. 
MAJOR ACCIDENTS ON SOUTHERN REGION COLOUR LIGHT 
MULTIPLE ASPECT SIGNAL TERRITORY 1969 - 70. 
PRIMARY CAUSE: HUMAN ERROR LEADING TO SPD. 
Collision 
Derailment 
4. 1. 69 Paddock Wood 
18.11.69 Portsmouth 
12.11.70 Bexley Collision - Driver claimed 
27.11 • 71 
7. 9.72 
12.10.72 
20.12. 72 
25. 6.73 
25.10.73 
Portsmouth 
Clapham Junction 
ltlimbledon 
Copyhold Junction 
Cannon Street 
Waterloo Station 
unable to brake. 
Collision 
Derailment 
Freight Collision 
Collision 
Derailment 
Derailment 
Although the Waterloo-Bournemouth line of the Scuthern Region is 
fitted with BRAWS, none of the incidents listed in Tnble 3 took 
place over BRAWS lines. 
Table 4, below, summarises the results of this part of the analysis. 
TABLE 4. 
COLOUR LIGHT SIG~ALS 
BR BRAWS Unfitted Not fitted 
total fitted territory areas with BRA~IS 
within 
fitted 
territory 
NUI"lBER OF 
ACCIDENTS 120 10 8 (min) 9 
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Train-miles evaluation 
All the published data necessary for this part of the analysi~ 
has been listed in Tables s, 6 and 7. This information is, howRver, 
not sufficient to give a fine enough breakdown as required. 
To overcome this problem, assumptions based on extrapolations 
and information given verbally have been made. To estim2te the 
possible error, a sensitivity analysis of the results will follow. 
Assumptions: 
a) It will be assumed that 70% of all train miles occur in colour 
light signal territory. 
Data: Colour light signals are fitted on 9 • 273 "'41~·of all 22,561 -~~;J~~~~ 
running track miles. 
All the busiest lines have colour light signals. 
b) It will be assumed that there is no BRAWS on the Southern 
Region (excluding Waterloo-Bournemouth) and furthermore that 
the SR carries: 
60% of all EMU traffic! these are taken as 
10% of all BR freight conservatiJe estimatns. 
SR achieves 48,500,000 train miles p.a. This amoutns to 
approximately 20% of all BR train milns, although it is felt 
that this figure is too conservative and that 30~ would be 
more appropriate. However, to avoid bias{ng the study, the 
figure of 20% will be used. 
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c) It will be assumed that the portion of BRAWS territory not 
fitted with track equipment, notably in complex layouts, 
accounts for 5% of all train miles. 
c) There is no published data on track miles fitted with BRAWS. 
The route-mile figure of 3,759 miles (1973) can be converted 
by ~ultiplying by a factor of 2.4 (BR average ration of 
T. Miles • 2 BRAWS track miles approx. 7,500 m). R. Miles • 
ROUTE MILES 
of which: 
TRACK MILES 
of which: 
TABLE 5. 
TRACK AND SIGNALLING ( IN 1973 ) 
SOURCE: BR ANNUAL REPORT AND ACCOUNTS 
Passenger Traffic only 
Freight and Passengers 
Freight only 
Fitted with BRAWS 
Electrified AC overhead 
DC overhead 
DC 3rd rail 
Running lines 
Sidings 
Equipped with colour light signals 
Electrified AC overhead 
DC overhead 
DC 3rd rail 
Sidings all systems 
525 
8,407 
2,394 
3,759 
979 
72 
1,1 OD 
22,561 
6,826 
9,273 
2,542 
193 
2,561 
465 
*1 
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*1 It is not know whether this figure includes mixed semaphore 
and colour lights (e.g. East Coast M.L.). 
TABLE 6. 
ROLLING STOCK (1973 BR ANNUAL REPORT AND ACCOUNTS) 
Locomotives: 22 shunting 
333 electric 
2,517 diesel 
of which: 2,742 are fitted with BRAWS 
FITTED WITH 
TOTAL 
BRAWS 
Diesel Multiple Units: 2,044 + 1,424 1,7B6 
power cars coaches 
Electric Multiple Units: 2,665 + 4,508 1,459 
power cars coaches 
TABLE 7. 
TRAIN MILEAGES (LOADED TRAIN MILES) 
(1973 BR ANNUAL REPORT AND ACCOUNTS) 
Coaching stock.: Diesel 55,853,000 
Electric 12,987,000 
DMU 55,451,000 
EMU: 70,239,000 
Freight Diesel 48,933,000 
Electric 4,957,000 
Total: 244,420,000 
-------------------------------
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BRAWS is also fitted in semphore territory and it will be assumed 
that all colour light signal territory, with the exception of the 
Southern Region, is fitted. 
EVALUATION: 
Non-colour light Colour light Colour light Colour light 
with or without with BRAWS and BRAWS un- not fitted 
BRAWS fitted areas with BRAWS 
Train miles 
% 30 45 5 20 
Accidents per % of Train Miles. 
TABLE B. 
SUMMARY 
Non Colour Colour light signals 
' BRAWS TERRITORY Non Light 
Fitted areas Non-fitted BRAWS 
-- ·- .. 
. --·· 
.. 
----
Signals areas Territory 
--- -- ---- -·-
.. 
.. 
Number of accidents 93 10 B 9 
% of Train Miles 30 45 5 20 
Accident Rate .22 1,6 
3.1 .45 (% TM) .36 
.39 
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III.S. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
TABLE 9. 
NON BRA~S TERRITORY CARRIES 25% OF TRAIN MILES 
Non Colour Colour light signals 
BRAWS Territory Non 
Light 
~itted areas Non-fitted BRAWS 
Signals areas Territory 
Number of accidents 93 10 8 9 
% of Train Miles 30 40 5 25 
Accident Rate .25 1,6 
.36 
(%TM) 3.1 .46 
.385 
TABLE 10. 
- -·----·- -
SRAWS ACCOUNTS FOR SO% OF TRAIN MILES. 
Non Colour Colour light signals 
BRAWS TERRITORY Non 
Light 
~itted areas Non-fitted BRAWS 
Signals areas Territory 
Number of Accidents 93 10 8 9 
% of Train Miles 30 50 5 20 
Accident Rate .2 1,6 
.45 
(%TM) 3.1 .327 
.385 
--------------------------------
- 142 -
Thus indicating that colour light signals have made a much 
greater contribution to safety than BRAWS. 
111.6. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The following factors are recognised as having an effect on the 
validity of this study: 
The effects of using permanent magnets to indicate the braking 
point to severe (and also to temporary) speed restrictions 
(these are the so called "Morpeth" magnets). 
Empty train miles have not been considered due to the lack of 
reliable data (although it is believed they may account for as 
much as 15% of Train Miles). 
Single Manning practice in the Southern Region (non BRAWS 
territory with the exception of the Waterloo-Bournemouth 
line), which make it difficult to separate the effects of single 
manning and A.w.s. 
The use of train miles instead of signal passed, as in busy 
areas there are more signals per mile than on plain track in 
low density lines. 
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APPENDIX IV (Supplement to Section 6.1) 
COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
Solid State Technigues in Signalling 
Objectives: 
To investigate.the use of microprocessors and allied electronic 
technologies in fail-safe railway signalling systems. The high 
and ever increasing costs of labour, cabling and special components 
such as signalling relays, could be signifit:antly avoided by the 
use of the new technologies. 
The study will involve the design of fail-safe telemetry systems 
and the design of solid state interlocking techniques - both of 
them applicable to other systems, such as chemical processes and 
nuclear reactor protection, having therefore spinoff potential. 
The study will consist of the following phases: 
man- mater- comput-
power ials ing 
I: Study phase, duration one year, 
problem formulation and possible 
structures for the solution ( 1 year) 4 £2.5k £2k 
-
II: Hardware development, validation of 
principles and laboratory testing 
(2 years) 4 £5k £3k 
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man- mater- comput-
power ials ing 
III: Design of prototype ~nstallation 
(scope approx. one remote inter-
lockingJ (2 years) 4 f.40k 
IV: Testing of prototype installation 
(until 1984) 
V: Engineering stage - by CS & TE engineer £50,000 per year 
Present estimated cost of signalling per track mile £40,000, 
of which: Labour £20,000 
Cabling £10,000 
Remaining Equipment £10,000. 
These figures apply to an average cost for a major resignalling 
scheme and include the cost of buildings, train describer, signalling 
panel in the signal b~x, etc. 
The cabling costs given include both signalling and telecommunications 
cables and the actual interlocking amounts to 10% of the cost of a 
scheme. 
It is estimated that in the worst case the following savings can be 
realised: 
Labour: Nil 
* Signalling Cabling: 15% 
** Interlocking : 30% 
*Note: This saving is achievable through the use of fail-safe 
digital telemetry ( a likely saving would be 20% ). 
** Note: The installed cost for a safety relay (type 930) is 
in the order of £60 and this provides 8 front and 8 back contacts. 
The logic capability of such a device is, therefore, limited and 
large numbers of them are required. 
In terms of the total cost of a signalling scheme, the following 
worst case savings result: 
Labour: Nil 
Cabling: 5% 
Equipment: 3% 
(only signalling cables) 
(only interlocking) 
Thus, the worst case average track mile saving is: 
Labour: £ 
Cabling: £ 500 
Interlocking: £ 300 
£ 800 net saving per track mile. 
In practice, it is expected that costs of both cabling and signalling 
relays will rise faster than the cost of electronic equipment. 
These figures cannot be substantiated at the present time and are 
based on engineering judgement. The study reveals, however, that 
even marginal savings result in a favourable benefit-cost ratio 
and would appear to justify the study. 
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An additional incentive may be an increase in reliability, 
. inherent in the microprocessor technology, which may heip to reduce 
the stock of spares (n,ot quant~fied in the study). 
There are 9,400 track miles yet to be implemented in the 
Signalling Plan. The current rate of implementation is 550 track 
miles per annum, with a target fitment figure of 800 track miles 
per annum. In addition, assuming a 40 year life for signalboxes, 
commencing in 1990, a renewal plan will commence; i.e. the 
London - Crewe line, giving the following planned investment: 
Outstanding track miles in signalling plan 
(based on 1981 total BR track miles; 20,500 
and 1,500 track miles not qualifying for colour 
light signalling) 
Case I: Current fitment rate (worst case 
analysis) 
Outstanding track miles in 1985 (new 
technology available) 
Completiori of signalling plan and 
.beginning of replacement of existing 
installations: 1992 
Saving in installation costs: (constant) 
. 
. 
9,400 track miles 
500 t.m.p.a. 
3,900 
£800 per track mile 
£440,000 p.a. 
Case 11: Desirable fitment rute 
(= target rate) 800 t.m.p.a. 
Outstanding track miles in 1986 ( new 
technology available) 1,400 
Compl~ti6~-6f signalling plan ~nd 
beginning of replacement of existing 
installations: 1897 
COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS (WORST CASE) 
Fitment rate = 500 track miles p.a. 
DISCOUNTED BENEFIT = (1985- 200D) (10% rate) 
(Discounted {cost of new technology - cost of 
present technology} •••••••• £ 1,619,200 
DISCOUNTED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT COSTS (1976 - 1984) £ 201,220 
Assumption: Probability of technical success: 0,6D 
Probability of investment capital 
being available (signalling 
being vital to railway operation 
and equipment being life-expired): 
This work is a direct spinoff from the Train Control developments 
under trial at Wilmslow~ 
WORST CASE BENEFIT TO COST RATIO FOR THE R & D PROGRAM: 
6 ( £1,619,200) o, 1 £20 ,220 = 4,8 : 1 
In view of the favourable ratio obtained for the worst case 
analysis and in addition, the fact that the modernisation of 
signalling equipment remains an important priority as far as BR 
is concerned, it is considered that neither an "opti~istic" nor 
a "likely" study will contribute any useful information. 
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APPENDIX V. 
RELATION OF THE PRESENT THESIS WITH OTHER RESEARCH 
ACTIVITIES AT LOUGHBOROUGH UNIVERSITY 
The Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering at 
Loughborough University has collaborated with the British 
Railways R & D Division since 1969. 
A major effort in the study of moving block signalling systems 
was carried out by L. Pearson, Ph. D. 
Present research by the author, Mr. P.D. Thomas and Mr. 
K. Gavin is concerned with analysing on-line control strategies 
with the objective of deriving quantitative techniques to measure 
performance, and the areas covered in the respective studies 
are safety and full automation, the problems of operating 
single vehicles and traffic regulation. 
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